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ABSTRACT
Epidemic models are commonly used to model the propagation of malicious
mobile code like a computer virus or a worm. In this dissertation, we introduce stochastic
techniques to describe the propagation behavior of malicious mobile code. We propose a
stochastic infection-immunization (INIM) model based on the standard SusceptibleInfected-Removed (SIR) epidemic model, and we get an explicit solution of this model
using probability generating function (pgf.). Our experiments simulate the propagation of
malicious mobile code with immunization. The simulation results match the theoretical
results o f the model, which indicates that it is reliable to use INIM model to predict the
propagation o f malicious mobile code at the early infection stage when immunization
factor is considered.
In this dissertation, we also propose a control system that could automatically
detect and mitigate the propagation of malicious mobile programs at the early infection
stage. The detection method is based on the observation that a worm always opens as
many connections as possible in order to propagate as fast as possible. To develop the
detection algorithm, we extend the traditional statistical process control technique by
adding a sliding window. We do the experiment to demonstrate the training process and
testing process o f a control system using both real and simulation data set. The
experiment results show that the control system detects the propagation of malicious
mobile code with zero false negative rate and less than 6% false positive rate. Moreover,

iii
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we introduce risk analysis using Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to limit the
false positive rate. Examples of risk control using SPTR are presented. Furthermore, we
analyze the network behavior using the propagation models we developed to evaluate the
effect of the control system in a network environment. The theoretical analysis of the
model shows that the propagation of malicious program is reduced when hosts in a
network applied the control system. To verify the theoretical result, we also develop the
experiment to simulate the propagation process in a network. The experiment results
match the mathematical results.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Computer Security
The security o f a computer system or a network system includes the
confidentiality, integrity and assurance of the system. The definitions of confidentiality,
integrity and assurance are as follows [Phoha 2002]:
Confidentiality: “The property of not being divulged to the unauthorized parties.
A confidentiality service assists in the prevention of disclosure of information to
unauthorized parties.”
Integrity: “a condition in which data or a system itself has not been modified or
corrupted without authorization.”
Assurance: “ensuring the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and
non-repudiation o f information and information systems by incorporating protection,
detection and reaction capabilities to restore information systems.”
An intrusion is a series of malicious activities that attempts to comprise the
security o f a computer or a network system [Ye 2000]. An intrusion detection system
analyzes the activities performed in a computer or network to look for evidence of
malicious behavior. There are two categories of intrusion detection method. One is
anomaly detection, and the other is misuse detection. Intrusion detection systems using

1
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the anomaly detection method generally build profiles for normal activities, and identify
system activities which vary from the established profile as intrusion attempts [Eckmann
2002]. An intrusion detection system using misuse detection technique builds a profile
with signatures of known attacks and compares current activities with those signatures.
An intrusion is signaled when there is a match between current activities and the profiled
intrusion activities.
Both anomaly detection and misuse detection have advantages and disadvantages.
Anomaly detection is able to detect unknown attacks, but there is always a trade off
between false negative and false positive. False negative is defined as “events that are not
flagged intrusive, although they actually are,” and false positive is defined as “anomalous
activities that are not intrusive but are flagged as intrusive [Denning 1990].” Anomaly
detection systems are also computationally expensive because we need to keep track of,
and update all system profiles. Misuse detection has a relatively low false positive rate,
but it cannot detect unknown attacks.
Intrusions exploit the flaws of the system architecture, the operating system, the
server system, or the other software systems. A complete secure system is not really
feasible because designing and implementing a totally secure system is an extremely
difficult task. Flaws in the programs and operating systems are prevalent [Miller 1995].
In practice, it is not possible to build a completely secure system.
The financial loss caused by the intrusion of malicious programs accounts for a
large amount o f losses caused by computer security problems [Usa 2001]. The following
section gives a brief view o f malicious mobile code.
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1.2 Malicious Mobile Code
This section talks about malicious mobile code. We will discuss the current
defense methods against malicious code and the general idea of mathematical modeling
of malicious code propagation.
1.2.1 What Is Malicious Mobile Code?
A malicious mobile code is a software program intentionally designed to move
from computer to computer or from network to network and modify the system without
the consent o f the user [Grimes 2001]. Major types of malicious mobile code include
viruses, worms, Trojans, and rogue Internet content. The first malicious program is a
computer virus developed by Fred Cohen [Cohen 1985, 1987] for research purpose. In
the early 1980s, Cohen did extensive theoretical research as well as setting up and
performing numerous practical experiments regarding viral type programs. Cohen's
definition [Cohen 1994] o f a computer virus is "a program that can 'infect' other programs
by modifying them to include a version o f itself." This definition has been generally
accepted as a standard definition of a computer virus [Fites 1992] [Levin 1990].
Worms are very similar to viruses in that they are computer programs that
replicate themselves and often, but not always contain some malicious functions that will
disrupt the normal use o f a computer system or a network system [Grimes 2001]
[Denning 1990] [Levin 1990]. Unlike viruses, worms exist as separate entities; they do
not attach themselves to other files or programs. Worms were first noticed as a potential
computer security threat when Christmas Tree [Denning 1990] attacked IBM mainframes
in December 1987. Christmas Tree is an executable file attached in an e-mail. Once
executed, it displays a Christmas tree and sends a copy to everyone in the victim’s
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address list. Someone argued that Christmas Tree is not a true computer worm program
but just a Trojan program with replicating mechanism [Denning 1990] [NISTIR4939].
The first computer worm, Morris, was released on November 2, 1988 [Spafford 1989a]
[Spafford 1989b]. It utilized the TCP/IP protocols, common application layer protocols,
operating system bugs, and a variety of system administration flaws to propagate. Morris
infected approximately three thousand computers during eight hours o f activity

[Spafford 1989a].
Malicious programs are created by exploiting the flaws of the system. Since it is
impossible to design a perfect system, there is always a possibility for new malicious
codes to be designed. The malicious function of these programs might be different, but
they usually have similar infection strategy. For instance, one class o f worm programs
always try to connect to as many hosts as possible so that they can be distributed easily
and quickly through the network. The increasing connectivity of network and the
growing use o f computers have led to more and more concerns about security problems
caused by malicious mobile codes like worms. In the past few years, the fast spreading
malicious mobile codes have disrupted tens of thousands of businesses and homes
worldwide and caused millions of dollars in loss [Usa 2001]. Famous ones include Code
Red [CERT01-19] and Nimda [CERT01-26] in 2001, SQL Slammer [CERT03-04],
Blaster [CERT03-20] and Welchia [SYMANTEC03] in 2003, and Netsky [CERT04-02]
and Sasser [CERT04-05] in 2004.
1.2.2 Defense against Malicious Mobile Code
Anti-virus tools are now installed on almost all computers to detect and prevent
the spread o f such programs. Common techniques applied by these tools are activity
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monitors, integrity management systems and virus scanners [Kumar 1992]. Activity
monitors alert users about system activity that is commonly associated with viruses.
Integrity management system warns the user of suspicious changes that have been made
to files. These two methods are quite generic, and can be used to detect unknown viruses
in the system. The drawback of these two methods is that they often flag or prevent
legitimate activities, and hence, disrupt normal work. As a consequence, the user may
ignore their warnings altogether. Virus scanning is the most commonly used method for
anti-virus tools because it is the most simple, economical way for virus detection. Virus
scanners search files, boot records, memory and other locations where executable codes
can be stored for characteristic byte patterns that occur in one or more known viruses.
The drawback is that virus scanners rely on the priori knowledge of the viral code, which
means they can only detect previously known viruses, but not new viruses. Thus, the
scanner has to be updated frequently [Forrest 1994] [Kumar 1992] [Wang 2000]. [Xu
2002] [Phoha 2003] and [Xu 2004] introduce a novel approach to control the spread of
virus and presents a technique to make them ineffective which is a complement of current
virus detection techniques. This approach models the process as a discrete event system
such that supervisory control theory can be applied to control the reproduction and
propagation of the malicious code. The drawback is that this approach is only effective
for executable files whose execution process could be modeled as a discrete event
system.
The detection of worm programs is still an open problem [White 1998], especially
for unknown worms. Currently, the most general way is to embed the worm detection
component in the anti-virus tools or intrusion detection systems. The methodology is
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similar as those used in the virus detection tools. In other words, use known signatures to
catch the known worms. For unknown worms, we do not have a general solution yet.
1.2.3 Epidemic Modeling of Malicious Code
The epidemic modeling of biological viruses and their dissemination has a history
o f about three hundred years [Andersson 2000] [Daley 2001]. Daniel Bemoullli presented
the first theoretical approach about the effects of the disease in 1760 [Daley 2001]. At
that time, the smallpox was widespread in Europe and affected a large proportion of the
population. In the early twentieth century, Ross and Hudson, Scoper, as well as Kermack
and Mckendrick, began to provide a firm theoretical framework for the investigation of
the infectious diseases [Anderson 1992], The mathematical models they provided help to
understand the mechanism by which diseases spread to predict the future spreading of the
epidemic and to control the spread of the diseases.
Epidemic modeling o f malicious code has become a popular research topic for
computer scientists since computer worm Morris was released in 1988 [Spafford 1989a]
[White 1998]. Propagation modeling helps us to understand the life cycle and fast
propagation nature of such malicious mobile codes. It also helps us understand the impact
o f countermeasures [Chen 2004] [Serazzi 2003], network traffic, and network topology
[Satorras 2001][Satorras 2002]. The propagation models of malicious code are extensions
o f the classic epidemic models [Zou 2003] [Zou 2002] [Kephart 1991] [Boguna 2002]
[Stamford 2002] [Wang 2003] [Chen 2003]. This dissertation will give the general classic
epidemic models and the related works of malicious code propagation modeling in
Chapter 2.
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1.3 The Contributions of This Dissertation
This dissertation first models the propagation of the malicious code using
stochastic technique, then proposes a control system that automatically detects and
mitigates the propagation o f such a malicious code. The control system works as a
complement to the current intrusion detection systems. The detection method of the
control system belongs to the anomaly detection method. We analyze the normal
connection behavior o f a host and compare the current connection behavior with the
normal behavior to identify the anomaly. The simulation experiment results match the
theoretical results.
1.3.1 Propagation Modeling of Malicious Code
This dissertation introduces stochastic techniques to model the propagation of
malicious mobile code. We build a stochastic propagation model that considers the
factors o f recovering and immunization. This model gives the probability that an
infection will or will not happen instead of a deterministic yes-or-no answer that relies on
the law o f large numbers. This model also allows probabilistic analysis of the virus and
propagation phenomenon. It is more precise than the deterministic method when we
study the infection scale and speed inside a community or an organization with varying
population size.
1.3.2 Early Detection and Propagation
Mitigation of Malicious Code
This dissertation proposes a control system to detect the propagation of malicious
code at the early infection stage. It also mitigates the propagation of malicious code over
the network so that the overall damage to our society could be reduced. It is novel to
apply the statistic process control technique to detect the malicious code. The general
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steps o f building a control system are given and the details of each step are presented in
simulation experiments. The framework of building the control system can be easily
extended and applied to other scenarios.
1.3.3 Risk Control and Network Performance Analysis
This dissertation also introduced Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to
control the false positive rate of the control system. Examples of risk control using SPRT
are presented using simulation data. To analyze the network effect of the control system,
we give a quantitative analysis of propagation mitigation. We build propagation models
to describe the propagation behavior of malicious code inside a network with and without
the control system. Mathematical analysis of both models shows a significant difference
in propagation speed and scale when the control system is applied on every machine in
the network. To verify the theoretical results, we simulate malicious code propagation on
virtual network using computer programs. All simulation results match the theoretical
results from the propagation model.

1.4 The Organization of This Dissertation
The rest o f the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives the
background information and related research in both propagation modeling of malicious
mobile code using epidemic models and the early detection of malicious code. Chapter 3
introduces the stochastic method to describe the propagation models and proposes the
Infection-Immunization (INIM) model using the stochastic techniques. Chapter 4 gives
the framework of building a control system to detect and mitigate the malicious code, and
then shows the experimental details of the training process and testing process of the
control system. The testing results are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also presents the
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effect o f the control system by analyzing the network performance. Both theoretical
results and simulation results are presented. Chapter 5 is the conclusion and suggestions
for future work.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH

This dissertation first uses stochastic techniques to model the propagation of
malicious mobile code, and then proposes a control system to detect and mitigate the
propagation o f malicious mobile code at the early infection stage. The detection
algorithm of the control system uses extended Process Control technique. This chapter
provides background information of epidemic modeling, statistical Process Control, and
related research in areas o f malicious code propagation modeling as well as early
detection o f malicious code.

2.1 Epidemic Models
The mathematical modeling of diseases and their propagation has a history of
about three hundred years [Daley 2001]. Epidemic modeling has three main aims [Daley
2001]. The first is to understand the mechanism by which diseases spread. The second
aim is to predict the future course of the epidemic. The third aim is to understand how we
may control the spread o f the epidemic. A good epidemic model captures the essential
features o f the epidemic, makes reasonable predictions, and evaluates the effect of control
method. The following two subsections give a brief review of the early mathematical
models for the spread o f infectious diseases. Readers who want a more detailed overview
are referred to [Bailey 1975] and [Anderson 1992].

10
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2.1.1 Deterministic Modeling
In this section, we introduce two classical deterministic epidemic models, the
Susceptible Infected (SI) model and Susceptible, Infected and Removed (SIR) model.
Both models assume that the population is homogeneously mixed. If we consider each
individual as a vertex in a graph, from the graph theory point of view, a homogeneously
mixed population means a fully connected graph.
2.1.1.1 Deterministic SI model
In this model, each host stays in one of the two states: susceptible (S) or infectious
(I). SI model assumes that once a host is infected, it becomes infectious and it will never
become susceptible again. The only state transition is: S -> I (see Figure 2.1).

Susceptible

Infected

Figure 2.1: State transition of SI model.

N is the size o f the population;
S(t) - S is the number o f susceptible hosts at time t,
I(t) = I is the number of infected hosts at time t.
P is the pair wise infection rate.
At any time t, we have S(t) + I(t) = N.
Using Ordinary Differential Equation, we have
^

at

= /» (< )/»
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which is the same as
^ p - =P (N -m )l(t)
at

2.2

Let k - ) 6N, i(t) = I{t) / N , Equation 2.2 becomes
^ = 4 -i(o K o
at

=>

*'(0 =

ekt
ekt - c

I -N
Let /(0) = 10, so z'(0) = 10 / N , we get c = —-------. Plugging c into the above equation,
Iq
we get
i(t) =

I 0ekt
( N - I 0) + I 0eu ’

which is the same as

Figure 2.2 shows the infection evolution process given N = 10000, /3 = 1/ N I 0 =1.

time units

Figure 2.2: Infection evolution of SI Model.
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Figure 2.2 illustrates that the infection evolution procedure can be roughly divided
into three stages: the slow starting stage, the fast spreading stage, and the saturating stage.
Let i(t) = I(t)/N, at the beginning, when i(t) —>■0, the number of infectious hosts grows
almost exponentially.
From Equation 2.3, time t needed to infected I individuals of the whole population
is derived as
t=

1 , (N - I 0)I
In—
fiN ( N - 1 ) 1 0

2.4

Table 2.1 presents the time steps needed to infect certain proportion of the population
with a different number of initially infected individual I 0.Thetime step valuesin all the
three tables (Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table 2.3) are calculated usingEquation 2.4.

Table 2.1: Time steps needed to infect / individuals when 70 varies
(N= 10000, fi = 0.0001)
100

1000

5000

9999

i

4.61

6.91

9.21

18.42

10

2.31

4.71

6.91

16.12

100

—

2.40

4.59

13.81

Table 2.1 shows that as the initial number of infected nodes / 0 increases, the time
steps needed to infect the population decrease dramatically at the beginning. For
example, the time steps needed to infect 1,000 individuals in a population o f 10,000 when
I 0 is 100 is almost one third of the time steps needed when I 0 is 1. But the time steps
needed to infect the whole population does not change that much as we can see from
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Table 2.1. Table 2.2 presents the time steps needed to infect a certain proportion of the
population when population size N varies.

Table 2.2: Time steps needed to infect certain percentage of N when /V varies
(Io = l , 0 =l/N)
N/100

N/10

N/2

N-l

1000

2.31

4.71

6.91

13.81

10000

4.61

7.01

9.21

18.42

100000

6.92

9.31

11.80

23.02

Table 2.2 shows that when the population size increases, the time steps needed to
infect the same proportion of the population also increase, and they increase faster at the
beginning (I = N/100) than near the end (I = N/2). From Table 2.2, we know that when
population N increases, the slow starting stage gets longer. Table 2.3 gives the time steps
needed to infect a certain number o f individuals when N varies.

Table 2.3: Time steps needed to infect I individuals when N varies
(I0 = l,/3 = l / N)
5

10

100

500

999

1000

1.61

2.31

4.71

6.91

13.81

10000

1.61

2.30

4.62

6.27

7.01

100000

1.61

2.30

4.61

6.22

6.92

From Table 2.3, we observe that the infection is slow at the very beginning. It
infects less than 10 individuals during the first two time steps. Then suddenly it increases
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almost exponentially. During the next two time steps, more than 50 individuals are
infected. The infection slows down when the infection comes to the third stage. It takes
almost the same time steps to infect a certain number of individuals (see Table 2.3), but it
takes more time steps to infect the whole population if the population size is larger (see
the last column of Table 2.2).
2.1.1.2 Deterministic SIR model
The first complete mathematical model for the propagation of infectious diseases
was a deterministic model given by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927 [Dailey 2001]. In
this model, each host is in one of the three states: susceptible (S), infectious (I), or
removed (R). This model assumes that once a host is infected, it will recover or die in the
end. Whether dead or recovered, it will never be susceptible to the same disease;
therefore, it will stay in the removed state forever. So the state transitions of the SIR
model is: S -» I -> R (see Figure 2.3).

Infected

Removed

Figure 2.3: State transition of SIR model.

If we let R(t) represent the number of removed hosts at time t, then we have N =
S(t) + I(t) + R(t). L e t/ represent the removal rate. In a homogeneously mixed
community, we have
dS(t)
=- m ) m
dt
dl(t)
= PS(t)I{t)-yI{t)
dt
dR(t)
= yl(t)
dt
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with initial conditions S(0) = S 0, 1(0) = I Q, and R(0) - 0 .
The Kermack-McKendrick model improves the SI model by considering that the
infectious hosts may recover or die after some time. But this model does not consider the
immunization o f the susceptible hosts while immunization has become a very popular
way, not only to prevent the outbreak of the infectious diseases, but also to prevent the
outbreak of the infectious malicious code.
2.1.2 Stochastic Modeling
Stochastic modeling has been used to model the growth of population, the price
changing o f the stock market, the queuing process, etc. This section gives a brief
introduction to stochastic process and stochastic epidemic modeling o f diseases.
2.1.2.1 Introduction to stochastic process
A stochastic process is a family of random variables X(t) describing an empirical
process whose development is governed by probability laws [Chiang 1980]. The time
parameter t could be either discrete or continuous. In diffusion processes, both X(t) and t
are continuous variables, while in Markov chains, X(t) and t take discrete values. The
main interest is the probability distribution p k (t) = Pr{X(t) - k } ,

k = 0 ,1, 2,3 ••• .

2.1.2.2 Stochastic epidemic modeling
A simple stochastic epidemic modeling assumes that the population consists of
only susceptible individuals and infective individuals. Once a susceptible individual is
infected, it becomes infective and stays at the infected state forever. Let random variable
X(t) = S(t), and Y(t) = I(t), recall that S(t)+I(t) = N, so X(t)+Y(t) = N, then the only
transition from t to t + A is (S, I) to ( S - 1 , / +1) with probability /?.
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We have Pr{(X, Y){t + A) = (S -1 , / +1) | (X, Y)(t) = (S , /)} = J3SIA + o(A ),
and Pr {(Z, Y)(t + A) = (S , I) \ (X, Y)(t) = (S , /)} = 1 - J3SIA - o(A)
where o(a ) represents the higher order function of A such thato(A)/A -> 0 when A -> 0.
Then,

the

forward

Kolmogorov

equation

system

for

the

state

probability

A (<)=Pr{X(() = S |X (0 ) = iV - l} is
4P» = - j 3 ( N - I ) I p N(t)
dt
dPj
= -/3i{N - I ) P i(t) + /?(/ +1 )(N - 1 - 1 ) p M (0
dt
dPo
= - f 3 ( N - \ ) I Pl(t)
dt

0

o'

P n O)

1
1

+

0

0

p N-\(t)

(N - 2)(7 + 2)

0

PN-2(t)

0_

. Po (0 .

1
1

1

0

**-1

1

1

..

E k.) _= -/3
dt

0
+

1

1

In matrix form, for P(t) = ( p N(t), p N_x(t), ■■■, p 0(t))r , we have

0

0

...

- l( i V - l )

= - pAP(t)
We can use the matrix analysis [Dailey 2001] to solve the equations, and the
solution is known to be P(t) = e~pAt p ( 0). But the explicit result is not easy to be derived
with this method. We may use Laplace transform or probability generation function or a
mixture of both to obtain the explicit solution. This dissertation uses the probability
generation function (pgf) to get the probability that / individuals are infected at time t.
We will introduce pgf in Chapter 3 and show the details of using pgf technique to solve
the stochastic propagation model of malicious mobile code.
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2.2 Literature Review of Malicious Mobile Code
Propagation Modeling
A reliable propagation model helps us to understand the life cycle of a selfreplicating program, to predict the propagation scale and speed, and to estimate the effect
o f factors like network topology, network traffic, and countermeasure techniques [Chen
2004] [Serazzi 2003] [Satorras 2001].
Kepart and White [Kephart 1991] built a SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible)
model to model the virus propagation, and use deterministic Ordinary Differential
Equations (ODEs) to approximate the SIS model. They also present hierarchical model
and spatial model in [Kephart 1991]. Later, they introduced the Kill signal as a
countermeasure to reduce the spreading of computer virus and build a model for virus
propagation with the Kill signals and concluded that the Kill signal is effective in
reducing the spread of the virus [Kephart 1993]. Stamford et al. [Staniford 2002]
constructed deterministic SI (Susceptible-Infected) model based on the empirical data
from the outbreak o f the Code Red worm. Serazzi and Zanero [Serazzi 2003] surveyed
the existing models for virus and worm and came out with a compartment-based model
that deals with the propagation inside and outside of an Autonomous System (a sub
network administered by a single authority). Zou et al. [Zou 2002] gave a model for Code
Red Worm propagation based on the classical SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Removed)
model. They introduced two factors that might affect the worm propagation; that is, the
countermeasure effect and decreased infection rate because of Internet congestions
caused by the worm. Ramualado Pastor-Satorras et al. studied the effects of network
topology on epidemic models [Boguna 2002] [Satorras 2001] [Satorras 2002].
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All the above models use a deterministic approach to represent the models; that is,
the models are described by a system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) except
[Kephart 1991]. [Kephart 1991] gave a linear birth and death process when discussing the
expected lifetime of the infection.
Under the homogeneous assumption, every individual in the population is
assumed to be equally likely to infect or to be infected by every other individual. This
approximation works well when each individual has many randomized contacts with
others. However, if the number of contacts that a typical individual has with others is
fairly small and/or the pattern of contacts is more or less localized, the homogeneous
approximation fails. We suspect that the majority of today's computer populations are
characterized by a degree of sparsity and locality that invalidates the homogeneous
mixing approximation. In this dissertation, we introduced a factor B, the average number
of contactors an individual could have, into the epidemic models.
Although ODEs can be safely used to approximate a stochastic process when the
population size is large, it is more accurate to use stochastic models when the population
size varies. Moreover, the spread of infectious disease or malicious programs is actually
stochastic [Zou 2003] [Daley 2001] [Andersson 2000], so it is natural to model it with the
stochastic model. The stochastic model gives the probability that an event will happen
instead of deterministic yes-or-no answer relying on the law of large numbers [Andersson
2000]. Actually, when the population size is big, it shows that the deterministic model is
the convergence of a stochastic model. We believe both models are important to
understand the propagation o f a malicious mobile program like a worm or a virus.
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Andersson and Britton [Andersson 2000] concluded that stochastic models are preferred
when their analysis is possible; otherwise, the deterministic model should be used.
This dissertation focuses on the stochastic propagation characteristics of malicious
mobile programs; thus, we use stochastic models to describe the spreading of a malicious
program over the Internet. The benefits of the stochastic model are: (1) It gives the
probability of whether or not an infection will happen instead o f a deterministic yes-or-no
answer relying on the law of large numbers; (2) It allows probabilistic analysis of the
malicious code propagation phenomenon; (3) It is more precise than the deterministic
method when we study the infection process inside a community or organization where
the population size varies; and (4) We could further derive the waiting time for the
occurrence of the Ath infection based on the stochastic model.

2.3 Literature Review of Early Detection
of Malicious Mobile Code
The propagation speed o f malicious code has increased dramatically in recent
years. As we pointed out before, a malicious code spreads almost exponentially at the
early infectious stage when there is no counter action taken, so we need to respond
automatically before it is identified. Cliff Zou [Zou 2003] proposed an early detection
system by monitoring the illegitimate network traffic. A Kalman filter is used to detect
the presence o f a worm by detecting the trend. When the monitoring system encounters a
singe of illegitimated network traffic, the Kalman filter is activated. The traffic is claimed
to be caused by worm propagation when the estimated infection rate stabilized and
oscillated a little bit around a constant positive value. One disadvantage of the approach
is that the machine will be quarantined when illegitimated traffic is detected. This may
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irritate the users when false alarm happens. Users tend to disable the intrusion detection
system even when the false alarm rate is not very high.
[Williamson 2002] proposed a filter algorithm based on the observation of
connection behavior. Evidence from [Heberlein 1990] and [Hofineyr 1999] showed that
during virus propagation, an infected machine will connect to as many machines as
possible in order to spread as fast as possible. The idea of the filter algorithm is to use a
series o f timeouts to restrict the rate of connections to the new hosts; any traffic that
attempts to connect at a higher rate is delayed. The filtering mechanism is user
transparent, which means a user cannot take active actions to remove the malicious code
and fix the system flaws the malicious program exploits.
The control system we proposed here is based on the same observation as in
[Williamson 2002]. We applied statistical Process Control technique to automatically
detect and mitigate the propagation of the malicious code. The advantages of this
approach are: (1) The detection delay is small; the propagation of a malicious code can be
detected as the very first beginning; (2) An explicit message will be given when anomaly
connection behavior is detected so that a user could take active counteractions to fight for
the malicious program; (3) The propagation rate of the malicious code is reduced
automatically so that the overall damage is reduced; and (4) The control system does not
disconnect the machine from the Internet so that users will not feel annoyed caused by
the false alarms.

Furthermore, we could give a mathematical estimation o f the

propagation mitigation scale using mathematical propagation models. Besides, the
hypothesis test underlying the detection algorithm gives quantitative evaluation of the
false alarm rate.
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2.4 Statistical Process Control
2.4.1 A Brief Review of Process Control
The use of statistical method in process control began at the Bell Lab in the 1920s
[Hansen 1987], It has been widely used in the industry to manage, monitor and control
the production quality [Hansen 1987]. The basic idea of Process Control is collecting and
analyzing the past data, and comparing new data with past data to identify process
violations.
Figure 2.4 gives the general outline of statistical Process Control. To apply
Process Control techniques, we assume that the sample data follows normal distribution.
Thus, when a process is in control, we know (1) about 68% of the plotted points lie in one
standard deviation of the central line and 34% at each side; (2) about 13.5% of the plotted
points lie in between one and two standard deviations on both sides of the central line;
and (3) about 2.5% o f the plotted points lie in between two standard deviations and three
standard deviations. If the quality of a product changes, the plotted points will not follow
the variation patterns given above. The operator needs to investigate the possible causes
and adjuss it so that the quality of production is consistent. Control charts, like X chart
and R chart, are useful tools to help us visualize the quality control so that we can identify
the change o f quality more easily and straightforward.
The hypothesis being tested at the monitoring period is
H 0 -Mx = Mo
against the alternative
H x - Mx * Mo
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where ji0comes from the base period and jux is the mean of the sample data we just
collected. There are two types of error defined with this hypothesis test. One is called
type I error ( a ) , which is defined as the probability that we reject H 0 when H 0is true.
Type I error also means the probability when a point is beyond the control limit, and we
identify it as a signal o f quality change but actually it is not. Another one is called type II
error (/?), which is defined as the probability that we accept H 0when H 0 is not true.
Type II error is also the probability of a point is inside the control limit, and we identify
the process is under control, but the process is actually out of control. The power of the
hypothesis test is given by (l - /?). In industry, control limits are usually established at
three standard deviations from the central line. Then, the probability that a type I error
will occur is 0.26%.

Algorithm: Outline of Process Control
Phase 1: Base period
Step 1: Collect sample data
Step 2: Estimate the parameters
Step 3: Calculate the control limits
Step 4: Check each observation of the base data
Step 5: If it is over control limits, remove it and back to step 2
Step 6: If all observations are within the control limits
Extend the control limits to monitoring period
Phase 2: Monitoring period
Use the control limits established during base period to test the hypothesis
that “the process is in control”.
Figure 2.4: Outline of process control.

We can see the idea o f Process Control is very similar to the idea of anomaly
detection, which is profiling the normal pattern of an object and comparing the current
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pattern with the profile to determine the possible violation. We will apply Process
Control technique to design the detection algorithm of the control system.
2.4.2 An Overview of Building the Control
System Using Process Control
Techniques
The control system includes a controller and a monitor. It takes three phases to
build the proposed control system. Phase one is the training period during which the
monitor collects normal connection behavior as the base data, then the control rule is
defined for the controller using the base data. Phase two is the testing phase during which
the reliability o f the control system is tested using both normal and abnormal connection
data. Phase three is the monitoring period during which the controller checks each and
every observation the monitor collected to determine whether the current activity of the
machine is legal.
This dissertation extends the traditional Process Control technique by adding a
sliding window so that the base data always includes the most recent normal
observations. This makes our system adaptive to the changes of process mean, and the
false alarm rate is therefore reduced. The experiments demonstrate the reliability and
flexibility o f the control system. Furthermore, we present and compare the propagation
models o f malicious mobile code with and without the control system in order to evaluate
the effect o f the control system. The theoretical analysis shows that the detection method
is effective and the propagation is reduced more when more hosts adopt the control
system. Later, we simulate the propagation of malicious mobile programs in a network
with a certain number o f nodes. The simulation results match our theoretical analysis,
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which indicate a success o f the propagation models and verify the effectiveness of the
control system.
The idea o f our approach is simple and straightforward, and so is Williamson’s
approach [Williamson 2002], People did not think about it before, mainly because most
people concentrate on how to protect ourselves from being infected. We install anti-virus
tools, firewalls, filters, and intrusion detection systems to keep us secure. But people
seldom think about minimizing the damage over the whole network if we have been
infected unfortunately by a malicious program. This dissertation provides a mechanism to
not only detect but also reduce the propagation of malicious codes at the early infection
stage so that human beings could gain precious time to take counter actions like patching
their system or upgrading their anti-virus tools to fight for the malicious mobile code.

2.5 Summary
This chapter provided the background information and related works of this
dissertation. We first introduced the deterministic and stochastic models of epidemic
modeling, and then we showed how epidemic modeling has been used to model the
propagation o f malicious code. We talked about the related work of early detection of
malicious code and discussed the advantages of our detection system. After that, we
introduced the process control technique and showed the framework of building the
proposed control system using the process control technique.
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CHAPTER 3

STOCHASTIC PROPAGATION MODELING
OF MALICIOUS MOBILE CODE

This chapter uses stochastic modeling to model the propagation of malicious
mobile code. Standard SI model and SIR model assume that the population is
homogeneous. In fact, the number of individuals a given individual contacted in a certain
period of time is limited. In this chapter, we introduce a new factor B, the average
number o f neighbors an individual has, into our model. In this dissertation, machine g
becomes one of the neighbors of machine h only when machine g and machine h have
direct contact with each other; for example, g sends an email to h, g downloads a file
from h, g visits the website provided by h, etc., and vice versa.
We first present a stochastic SI model, and show how to get the explicit solution
of the SI model using the pgf technique; then we present the stochastic INIM (InfectionImmunization) model which models the propagation of malicious code at the early
infection stage. We get the approximate solution of INIM model using the pgf technique.
We simulate the propagation evolution of a malicious mobile code using the INIM
model. The theoretical results approximate the simulation results, which indicates that we
can use the theoretical model to predict the propagation of malicious mobile code.

26
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3.1 Stochastic SI Model for Malicious
Code Propagation
The standard SI model divides the computer systems into two groups: one is
susceptible, and the other is infected. Any system is at either susceptible state or at
infected state. In the SI model, we assume that if a machine gets infected, it will never
recover and become susceptible again, so the only state transition is S -» I.
Let,
N b e the size o f the population.
I it) = i : denote the number o f infected machine at time t.
P ij(0,t)

= P r(/(0 = j

o f j infections at time

11 ( 0 ) = i )

t,

i, j =

0 , 1, 2,• • - where

p i j (0,t)

denotes the probability

given that there are i infections at time zero.

P : The infection rate. In reality, this rate varies over time because the propagation of
malicious code depends on the network bandwidth. At the beginning, a copy of the
malicious code could always infect a susceptible machine successfully since the
bandwidth of the network is enough to transfer all the byte stream of the malicious code,
while later on, each copy o f the malicious code could not reach the susceptible machine
successfully because o f the network traffic congestion; therefore, the infection rate
decreases over time. In our model, for simplicity, we assume the infection rate to be a
constant.
B : The number of machines that could be contacted by each machine during certain time
unit. Generally, B would vary, but for simplicity, we assume that B is a constant. B is the
same as the population size N in a homogeneous network, because any machine could
contact any other machine in the population at any time.
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Assume that one machine is infected at the beginning, and A is a small time interval in
which no more than one infection could happen within it. Let o(A) represent any function
o f A which tends to 0 faster than A . Following the analysis of a simple Poisson process,
we have:
(1) The probability that exactly one infection event happens in ( t , t + A) is
J3B(1 - i / N)(i - l)A + o(A ). This is so because in time interval A, one infected
machine could contact B machine, and i?(l - i / N) of those are susceptible, so
f3B(\ - i / N)A machines could be infected by one infected machine. Now, the
number of infected machines is (i - 1 ) , so the total number o f machines that could
be infected in time interval A is /3B(\ - i / N ^ i - l)A . Hence, ySfi(l - i / N ) ( i - l)A
is the probability that exactly one infection occurs. At the early infection stage
i« N,

so

the

probability

that

one

infection

event

occurs

is

approximately j3B(i - l)A . Since the probability that i-1 infection happened in (0,
t) is A,;-i(O,0,

probability that i infection events occur in time interval

(0, t + A) is Pij^i (0, t) [/3B(i - l)A + o(A)].
(2) The probability that more than one event, say q events, occurs during time
interval A is o(A ). The probability that i - q infection events happen in time
interval (0, t) is
interval (0, t + A) is

So, the probability that i infection happen in time
o(A).

(3) The probability that no event occurs in time interval A is 1 - /3BiA - o{A ). The
probability that all infection events happen in (0,t) is />u (0,t). So, the
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probability that i infection events happen in time interval (0, t + A) is
P \,i

(0,0[1 - fiBiA - o(A)].

Since only one o f the above three is possible and they are mutually exclusive, we can
combine all the three possibilities, so we have
P \,i

(0>t + A) =

P i

i-\ (o, t) [0B(i - 1)A + o(A)] + p x.(0,0[1 - /IBiA - o(A)]
+ Pu-q(Q^ ) °(A)-

Moving p u (0,t) from the right side to the left, and dividing both sides by A,

since

A

-> 0 , we get

P' ’(°’l + A)

= - Phl(o,t)fiBi + p u ^{0,t)pB(i - 1).

Therefore, we have
dpXJ(0,t)
dt

= ~ P u ( ° » l ) P B i + A , i - i ( ° > f ) P B (* ~ 0

3 •1 •1

The initial conditions are as follows. According to our assumption that only one machine
is infected at time* = 0, sop xl(0,0) = 1, and the probability of more than one machine
being infected is zero, so p xi (0,0) = 0, z > 1.
We use probability generation function (pgf) to solve Equation 3.1.1. The pgf is
given by
00

Gi M = T lPu(°>ty
1=1

By differentiating Equation 3.1.2, and substituting Equation 3.1.1, we get
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We can ignore
the values of the
first term when i
= 0 and of the
second term
when i = 1,
because the
probabilities are
not valid.

+Bj3s2Y d{ i - l ) p hi_l{ 0 , t y - 2
i>i

<>i

= - B j 3 s ^ - + Bfis2^ ds
ds

3.1.3

which can be written as
^

^

= B/3s{s-\)^~
ds

dt

dt

_ B J3s(s - \ ) ^ - =

ds

0

3 .1 .4

To solve the partial differential equation of 3 . 1 . 4 , we write the auxiliary equations
ds

=> ----------= Bfddt
s(l-s)

and dG,(s;t) = 0.

Using the following equality,
r
1
1
t
2ax + b - y l b 2 - 4 ac
— ------------------- I n ...................
ax +bx + c -db2 - 4 a c
2ax + b + sib2 - 4 a c

2

if b- 4 a c >0

we get,
=> In —
s-

1

= B(3t + c =>—— = ceBpt => - —- e Bfit = constant
5 - 1
s

From the second auxiliary equation, we get G7(s;t) = constant.
Therefore, the general solution of 3 . 1 . 4 is
5 —1

Gf (s;t) = 0 ( ------e Rfit ) where O is an arbitrary differentiable function.
5
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To obtain the particular solution, plug in the initial condition, and we get

Let 0 =

So,

5

-

1

1

1

=> 5= ------- , we get 0 (0 )-= -----5
1-0
1-0

G,(s;t) = 0 (

1
* '* ) = — — -----s
+ s —1 nnt
s

s —\s —Y)e

^

The solution o f Equation 3.1.4 is

g

> M

= -

- (5 - \)eE

3.1.5

Taking the first order derivatives of G, (s;t), we get the expectation of I as
dGj
d 4 < )]=
ds

m t
15—1 "

( s - ( s - \ ) eB»f $nt \ 2

'

3.1.6

5=1

Taking the second order derivative, we get
l - e B[St
m i - d ] = ^ = ( - 2)
ds2
( s - ( s - \)eBptf

e

B p t

I

s= i

W\„Bpt
= (~2)(1 - eBpt )e

So, the variance of / is a 2 = e \i 2] - (£[/])2 = E[l(l - 1)] + £ [ /] - (^[f])2
= (—2)(1 - em )em + eBpt - (eBp‘f = eBpt (em - 1)
Taking the z'th order derivative, we could get
d ‘G = K iv'-i;, (1 - e BptT Xem
_
ds1 i\
\ s - ( s - \)eBpt)M =0
(eBpt - l ) M

( eBpi - l V _1
m t

1
Bpt

\

1
pm

e

M (1 -eBptr leBpt
{em Y
V- l

1

J

According to the properties o f pgf, we get
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(
P l , i ( 0 »0

-

i Y-1 i
“

e Bpit ^

e Bpt

3.1.8

3.2 Infection-Immunization (INIM) Model
for Worm Propagation
In the Infection-Immunization model, the population is divided into three groups;
that is, susceptible, infected, and removed, which is the same as the standard SIR model.
The difference is that instead of recovered and therefore immunized after infected, a
machine could be immunized when it is healthy, which makes the propagation model
closer to reality because, for example, a computer user could immunize a machine by
downloading the patch or updating the anti-virus tool when the users get the message
about the malicious program. Both [Zou 2002] and [Wong 2004] present similar ideas of
immunization from a healthy machine, but neither of them gives a stochastic analysis of
their models.
Figure 3.1 shows the state transitions of epidemic propagation. The removed
machines include those immunized when still healthy and those recovered after infected.
A recovered machine is immunized and cannot be infected by the same worm again. If
we do not specify, the immunized machine includes both cases. In Figure 3. l,a,/3, and
y are the immunization rate, infection rate and recover rate, respectively.
s ( ‘) = s is the number o f susceptible machines at time t.
/(< )= / is the number of infected machines at time t.
M(l) = m is the number o f immunized machines at time t.
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Susceptible
(healthy)
.

S©

Infected
(infectious)

,

x
Rem oved
x
(immunized or recovered)
v
M(t)
>

Figure 3.1: State transition diagram of INIM model.

3.2.1 Stochastic Analysis of INIM Model
Assume that only one machine is infected at time zero, and A is a small time
interval in which no more than one infection could happen within it. To build the INIM
model, following the similar analysis of SI model, we have:
(1) The probability that exactly one infection event happens in (t, t + A) is
J3BQ. - (i - 1)/ N - m / N)(i - l)A+ o(A ). This is so because in time interval A, one
infected machine could contact B machine, and ( l - ( z - l ) / A - m l N) A of those are
susceptible, so 0 B ( l - ( i - 1)/ N - m l N) A machines could be infected by one infected
machine. Now, the total number of infected machine is (i - 1), so the number of
machines that could be infected in time interval A is ySS(l - (z - 1 ) / N - m / N)(i - l)A .
We assumed that A is a small time interval that no more than one event could occur
within it. Hence, f3B(l - (i - 1)/ N - m l N)(i - l)A is the probability that exactly one
infection occurs. At the early stage of infection, since i « N and m « N , the
probability o f one infection is approximately Bj3(i-l) A+ o(A ). The probability that
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i - 1 infection events happen in (0,/) is

(0,f); therefore, the probability that i

infection occur in time interval (0, t + A) is p u _x(0,t)( J3B(i - l)A+ o(A)).
(2) The probability that exactly one recover event occurs in (t, t + A) is (i + l)yA + o(A ).
This is so because the probability that one infected machine is recovered during time
interval A is y A . The total number of infected machine is i + 1, so the number of
machine that could be recovered during A is (i + l)yA. We assumed that A is a small
time interval that no more than one event could occur within it. Hence, the probability
that exactly one recover occurs is (i + \)yA. The probability that i +1 infection event
happens in (0, t) is p l M (0,t) ; therefore, the probability that i infection occurs in
time interval (0, t + A ) is p XM (0,/)( (z + l)/A+ o(A)).
(3) The probability that exactly i infection events happen in (0, t) and the number of
infection events does not change, i.e., no infection or recover occurs, during (t, t + A )
is (l - pBiA - iyA - o(A)). So the probability that i infection occurs in time interval
(0, t + A ) is p u (0,fXl- pBiA - i y A - o ( A)).
(4) The probability that more than one infection, say q infections, occurs during time
interval A, but no recover occurs is o(A ). The probability that i - q infection events
happen in time interval (0, t) is p hi^ ( 0 , t } So, the probability that i infection happens
in time interval (0, t + A) is p Xi_q (0,t) o(A ) .
(5) The probability that more than one recover events, say q recover events, occur during
time interval A but no infection occurs is o(A). The probability that i + q infection
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events happen in time interval (0, t) is p hi+q(0,t} So, the probability that i infection
occur in time interval (0, t + A) is p u+q (0,t) o(A ).
Since only one o f the above six is possible and they are mutually exclusive, we can
combine all three possibilities, so we have
p hi(0,t + A )= (l - PBiA - iyA - o(A))/?u (0,r)
+ A, m ( 0 , 0 [ ^ ( i -1)A + O(A)]
+ Pv+i (°»0 [O' + 0 r A + ° (A)]
+ Pu-i (°»*) °(A) + P u * ( ° > ° ( A>
Moving p u (0,t) from the right side to the left, and dividing both sides by A,

since

A

—>0 , we get

P,J(0,t + A ) - p u (0,l ) = (_ m
A

_ ir)

M

+ P l,i-

+ P v + i M ( i + l )y
Therefore, the differential equation is
dphj®’l l =

- i y ) p Xi (0, t)
+ p u _x(Q,t)PB{i-\)

3-2-1

+ P i,1+i(°^X i' + 1V
The initialconditions are as follows. According to our assumption that only one machine
is infected attimet = 0, so p I t(0,0) = 1, and the probability of more than one machine
being infected is zero, so p xi (0,0) = 0, i > 1.
Define pgf as
oo

G , M = I > u ( 0 > 'y
i= l
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3.2.2

Differentiating Equation 3.2.2 and substituting Equation 3.2.1, we have

= zt dPufatf - = ii y H/®* -

at

(°>o+ Pv-i (°»om* - o + a,,+i (o, *x* -

By extending the summation to each term, we get

i

+ Z P u -ife O M 1' - 1)5'
i

+ Z /vi(°>*X*‘+1V
i

Rearranging each term, we get

i

+ s 2Z

,

i

+ Z /V ife O fr '+ iW
i

which can be written as
dG
/ _
\ dG DO 2 dG
dG
— = -{BP + y ) s — + BPs2— + y —
at
as
as
cts

.

Let BP = A , we get
r/G
dt

/„

\ r/G
ds

. 2 ^G
ds

<^G
ds

— = -(A + y > — + As 2 — + y — = > —

dt

..2
-(As2- ( A

\

\ ^G „
=0
ds

+ y )s + y ) —

To solve partial differential Equation 3.2.3, we write the auxiliary equations
ds
dt = ------ ;— ------r
and d G , (s;t) = 0
- (As ~(A + y ) s + y )
IfA > y
From the first auxiliary equation, we get
[dt = f -------;— j—----r
ds.
- (As ~ ( A + y )s + y )
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Using the following equality
r
1
1
, 2ax + b--yjb2 - A a c
— ----------- = —...-.-••••••-— In-------------Jax +bx + c V^2 - A a c
2ax + b + 4 b 2 -Aac
(In this case, a = - l , b= (A + y), c = - y ,

.., 2 .
„
if b - A a c > 0,

Vb 2 - A a c = ^ j ( A - y ) 2 = A - y )

1
- 2 A s + (A + y ) - ( A - y )
1
As-y
w get C + t = -------- In----------------------- ^ —= ------- In'
A -y
- 2As + (A + y) + ( A - y ) A - y
1(5 -1 )
/Ls"
c.e(l~7)> = -------— where c, is the new constant contains C.
'
1 (5 -1 )
1

(5 -1 )

c7ea r)t = ———where c7 is the new constant contains c ,.
2
(5 -1 )
2
1
e a - r » ( L J L = C2

As-y
From the second auxiliary equation, we get Gf (s; t) = constant. Therefore, the general
solution o f Gf (s;t) is
G(s;t) = a > { ^ 9 - e (*-r)t}
As-y
To obtain the particular solution, plug in the initial condition, we get
G(5;0) = p lt ( 0 , 0 ) 5 ' = 5 (see initial conditions of Equation 3.2.1)

so G(s;0) = <D{

Let 6 =

As-y

As —y

e(X-y)0} = <D{

As-y

=5.

=>s = ^ l z l w e g e to ( 0 ) = . - f c i
0 1 -1
0A- 1

Therefore, the particular solution is
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y—

L g f 1 - ? ') '

G(s .t) = Oi ( s - V CW } ~ ** ~ y ________ _ y ( s - \ ) e ^ r)t - ( A s - y )
te-r
x l z L e( ^ _ ! M s - i ) e ^ - ( A s - r )
As-y
_ y( 1 - s)e{ r) + (As - y)

3.2.4

~ A ( l - s ) e (X~r)t + ( A s - y )
If A, < y , from the first auxiliary equation, we get
\dt = f --------— -4
r
ds.
■*
•* - (As - (A + y)s + y)
Using the following equality,
r
1
1
,
2ax + b - ^ b 2 - Aac .Cl2 A
—
= ,
= l n ..............................
if b - A a c > 0,
Jax +bx + c ^ ( b 2 - 4 a c )
la x + b + Vh2 - Aac
(In this case, a= - A , b= (A + y), c = - y ,

Vh2 - Aac = -yJ(y-A)2 = y - A )

we get

t+ c = - ! ~ ln^ - V + r ) - V - r )
y-A

2As - ( A + y) + ( A - y )

y-A

A s-y

Similar to solving the equation when A > y , we have
cxe (r-X)t _ M s ~ 1)
As-y
(r-w
s3 _
cxeir~‘
i>t IA

C* - 1 )

As-y

e( r- » i* LJL = c
s- 1
2
As
The general solution of the second auxiliary equation isG (s;t) = <E>{
- e iy~X)t )
s -1
Using the initial condition o f Equation 3.2.1, we haveG(s;0) = /?n (0,0)5'1 = s .
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So, G(j;0) = ®{— ^ e (y-Z)0} =
5 -1

=s .

5 -1

r ~e

Let0 = ^ Z
x - e

5-1

x -e

Therefore, the particular solution is
y_p(>'-w

G(S;0 = 4

yl

t e - r cM t

3.2.5

X ( s - l ) - ( X s - y ) e (r~X)t

5 -1

If A = y , we have

l d t = I - ( ^ - ( l + rV + y ) * '

Using the following equality,
f— -— ------- = ------ —
J ax +bx + c
la x + b

if b2 - A a c = 0,

(In this case, a = - X , b= (A + / ) , c = - / ,

Vb 2 - Aac = y j ( y - X ) 2 - 0 )

we get
t + C —■

2

2

1

•2/ls + (X + y)

2ys ~ ( y + y)

y(s - 1)

1
-t = C
y ( s - 1)
The general solution of the second auxiliary equation is

G (s ;() = ® {—

!-—

r(5 -i)

-( }

Using the initial condition o f Equation 3.2.1, we have G(s;0) = ®{— ------- 0} =
y(s ~ 1)
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Let 6 = ------ -— =>5 = 1+ — ,
y ( s - 1)
By
we get 0 (0 ) = 1+ — .
6y
Therefore, the particular solution is
G(s;t) = 0{—
K '- O

1} = 1 +

t 1
= 1+
( - 4 - O r
H 5 -1 )

1
X (5-l)

5 -1
_ 1 - ty (5 -1 ) + (5 -1 ) _ 5 - ty(s - 1)
1- ty(s -1 )
1 - ty(s -1 )
1 - ty(s - 1)
Rearrange the terms, we get
3.2.6

G ( s -,t ) = s ( l ~ , r ) + , r .

l + ty —tys
We apply the properties o f pgf to get the mean and variance of I.
If A > y , taking the first order derivative of Equation 3.2.4, we get
.+ l r ( l „ s)e^

4 G _

ds
Let

+(A s_ r)].

A(l - s ) e (*-y)l + ( A s - y )
5

(~l)[A(l - s)e(X~r)t + (As ■ Y ) f

= 1, we get

dG .
y { - \) e (X-r)t + A , ,
- Ae(X~r)t + A
— L i=
;— + ( * - r ) ----------------d s 's='
(A-y)
" ( - 1)[(z - y ) ] 2
_ y ( - \ ) e (l~y)t + A - (~Ae(X~y)t + A) _ (A - y)e(X~y)t
=e(X~r)t.
(A-y)
(A-y)
According to the properties o f pgf, we get

ds
Taking the second derivative o f Equation 3.2.4, we get
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d 2G _ ( - y e ^ y)t + A ) ( - A e ^ ‘ +A) ,+[
ds2
(-1 X A i l - s ^ - 7* + ( A s - y ) f

+[ y( 1- s)e(l-y)t + (As - y)](-2)

d 2G x

w

+A]

~ ^ r)'
(-1 ) [ A ( l - s ) e ^ y)l+ ( A s - y ) f

- A e (X~y)t + A
(-1 )[ A ( l - s ) e (A-y)l + (As-y)]

( ~ y e ^ y)t+ A ) ( - A e ^ y)l+A) ir _ u „r)t , „ - A e ™ + A ,

(-1) [ ( i - r )]2

ds2 u ‘

+2[(A-y)]-

W i - j O ]2

■AfiW' 7') ,+A

P-y)]

= (-2)[-ye(A-y)t + A] ^

3

(A - y)

+ A +2 ^
** + A
(A - y)2

= 2 ~Ae{X 7)t + 1 (i +
(2 - r ) 2
According to the properties o f pgf, we get

Since <j2 = e [i 2] - (^[/])2 = E[l{l - 1)] + £[/] - (e [i ])2, we get
cr2=2 M l l - f - - ? .). [l +

- ^] + g(A- ^ - [e^ - ^ ] 2

- r) 2
-2 ^

(A - y)2

[i +

- A]+ ^ v

(-1-

(A - y f

r?

ri _ (A-y)t \
= ^ — ---- ^ . [ ( A 2 + y 2) e ^ y)t +2 A - 2A2]
(A -y)2

3.2.7

If A < y, taking the first order derivative of Equation 3.2.5, we get

do =
r-xe"-n
+
r (S - i ) - ^ - r )elr-n‘
ds A ( s - l ) - ( A s - r y r~:‘>' ( - l ) ( M s - t ) - ( A s - r ) e " - " ] '

_

Let s = 1, we get
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dG\ Y ( A d s ]°=' _ (A_ y)e(r-^
-

y-**™
-(A -y y ^

y ) e ^ 1
[_ (A_ r ) e ( ^ ]2 ^

i
fl _ .
[(A -y y ^ r

(r_ „

)

Ae

'

_ A e (7-Z)t - y + j Z - A e ^ ' ) _
- y +Z
(.X - r ) e (y-X)t
( Z - y ) e (r~X)t

So, E[l] = —
ds

3.2.8

Taking the second derivative o f Equation 3.2.5 G (s;t), we get

—

= (-1) (r -

- Ae'1--^) +

ds2

( - t ) U ( s -1) - (1, - y)e(' - r" y

+ (_2) b U - 0 - ( * - I * ™ ] ! * - f

rff£ ,

<*!

+

( -

l - ( z - r y r ' A):f

1

(-O K *

- r ^ ’ ^ ’Y

>

[ W

- r ^ r

fy_„(

^ Z - y ) e ^ l ) t { Z - Z e ^ ‘]

+2

[(A -y)^ -^ ]2

=2

r - ^ > '

2 )

>

'

-»■] w _

1)( r - ^ (' - ,)- ) a - ^ - J)') ,

^ { y - t e ^ W - X e ^ 1)

~(

,

r -

[ W

- r ^ r —

(* _ *

5

+ 2 j * - * ™ ] (, _ ^ . W)
[(A -y y ^ ']2

^ ~ lg(r ^
[(2- - Ae0'-**) - (y - ^ - A)()]
[(A -yy^ ]*
[ X - A e {y- x)t]

„

,

—2 -------------------- - (a —y )
t(A -y y ^ ]2

Therefore, the variance of l(t) could be obtained as
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<72 = e [i 2]-{ e [i ]}2 = e [i (i - 1)]+e [i ]-(£[/D 2
[A - Ae^ 1)(]

„ u

(i-r)i

-{X-r)+e™ - (e™ Y

2

3.2.10

[U -y )^ ']
From the above derivations, we can see the solution for the expectation of I is the same
when A * y ; that is,
I ( t ) = e {X~r)t

3.2.11

But the solution for the variance o f / i s different (See Equation 3.2.7 and 3.2.10).
/ \ s(\ —ty} ~hty
When A = y , we haveG (s;t) = -----------------. Taking the first order derivative of
1 + ty - tys
Equation 3.2.6, we get
dG
ds

1- y t
r
. ,
-ty
^-[ty + ( \- ty )s] 1 + yt-yts
(—1)(1 + t y - t y s ) 2

According to the property o f pgf, the expectation of / is

ds

yt-yt- 1

3.2.12

(—1)[—1]

Taking the second derivative o f Equation 3.2.7, we get
d 2G

— r =

ds

(l-yt)(- yt)
, r
1- y t
,
„
, , (-2 )(-yt) n
.]
— -— '
■■■ + ty[ ----------- - ------- 7 + (ty + (1 - yt)s) v A
( - 1 ) ( 1 + yt-yts)
(l + t y - t y s )
(l + t y - t y s f

Let s = 1, and according to the properties of pgf, we get

lv

n

ds2

i-i

(-1)

j

[1]3-

: yt ~ (yt)2+ ty\\ + yt]=2yt
So the variance of I could be
a 2 =E[l2}-(E[l]jl =E[l(l-l)\ + E[l]-(E[l])2= 2 y t + 1 - 1 2= 2 y t
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We can see that when X = y , the expected number of infected machines is a
constant as the initial value (See Equation 3.2.12), and the variance is a linear function of
t.
3.2.2 Discussion about Stochastic Model
and Deterministic Model
The corresponding deterministic model of the INIM model is

at
dM(t)
dt

aS(t)+yl(t) .

3.2.14

with initial conditions 7(0) = 1, S ( 0 ) - N - l , and M ( 0) = 0.
The first equation of 3.2.14 can be written as
dl(t)

(BJ3-y)dt.

i(t)
dl(t) _
Integrate both sides, we get f —z y = [ (B/3-y)dt=> In I(t) = (BJ3 - y ) t + c
J I(t)
J
I {t) = c,e
Use initial condition 7(0) = 1, we get cl = 1. So, the number of infected machines at time
t is
/(0 =

3.2.15

Notice that if we assume the machines are fully connected (homogenous network), B
equals to S(t), and the first equation in equation system 3.2.14 becomes
dl{t) _
dt
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In [Wong 2004], the authors also give a deterministic model with immunization
rate//. They call the model a “delayed immunization model” because immunization
starts at a time moment when a certain proportion of hosts is infected. In their model,
they use ( N - 1) to represent the number of suspected nodes S(t) , but it should be ( N - I ~
M) as given in the third equation of equation system 3.2.14 if we consider the
immunization from the healthy machine. The authors of [Wong 2004] ignored the
number of immunized node M when building the propagation model, but they did not
specify this approximation. As [Wong 2004] stated, the number of immunized nodes and
immunization rate is not easily observable, so we are not sure how much this
approximation affects the model’s accuracy. We can only ignore the number of
immunized machine M and approximate the number of susceptible node S(t) as N - I at
the early stage of infection. That is why we assume I(t) « N and M(t) « N and get
equation system 3.2.14. This assumption makes our model more applicable at the early
stage of infection which includes both the starting stage and the fast-growing stage. This
is also why the infected nodes grow exponentially as shown in Equation 3.2.15 instead of
logistically as given in Chapter 2.
From Equation 3.2.15, we can see the number of infected machines we get from
the deterministic model is exactly the same as the expected value of the stochastic model.
The solutions agree with the theory that the stochastic model converges to the
deterministic model when the population size is large [Andersson 2000].
From the stochastic model, we get both the expectation and variance of those
values at any time t so that we can evaluate the best and the worst infection situation
instead of a single number o f infected machines. This evaluation could be important
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under certain circumstances. For example, when the infection rate and the recover rate
are the same, the deterministic model shows the number of infected machines will not
change and keep the same number as the initial state. The expected value of the stochastic
model agrees with this result. But from the stochastic model, we also know that the
variance is increasing as time goes on, and the number of infected machines could be
infinite when t -» oo.

3.3 Simulation Analysis
3.3.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation program is written using C++ compiled with Microsoft Visual
C++ compiler under Windows XP environment. First, we randomly generate a simulated
network with a given number of nodes, say N nodes. Each node has r neighbors; r is a
random number ranging from a to b, where a and b are given real numbers and
~ ~ ~ = B , so 0 < a <r <b < N . Then for each node g , we randomly choose r nodes out
o f the N nodes as its neighbor. When node h is selected as the neighbor of g , we also
add g as one o f the neighbors of h . When we generate the neighbors for h , we will
randomly choose ( r - existing number of neighbors) as h ’s neighbors so that the total
number of neighbors is still r . The average number of neighbors each node has is B.
Our infection simulation system is based on this randomly generated simulation
network. The infection simulation system has three main procedures: infection,
immunization, and recovering. When we start the simulation, one node will be randomly
selected as the infected node. At each time step, all three events, infection, immunization
and recovering, occur simultaneously. In the infection procedure, each infected machine
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infects its neighbors with rate /?. Similarly, the recovering procedure checks all infected
nodes and tries to recover it with rate y, and the immunization procedure immunizes the
susceptible machines with rate a .
3.3.2 The Random Number Generator
The random number generator provided by C++ library is a function rand( ).
First, we need to initialize the random number generator by invoking srand{seed). Each
initializing seed generates a different random number sequence. We get one random
number from the sequence every time we call rand{ ) function. Those random numbers
returned by calling rand( ) function range from 0 to RAND_MAX, where RAND_MAX
is the maximum number a machine could generate. If we want uniform random numbers
in [a, b], we can use the expression x - a + (b - a) rand( )/(RAND_MAX+1.0). But the
problem with the random number generator is that the same seed always generates the
same random sequence. The random number generator we use to generate the random
network is provided by [Vetterling 2002], This generator avoids the problem we
mentioned in rand( ) function given by the C++ library.
3.3.3 Simulation Results and Results Analysis
We run the infection simulation using different a, P and y values with a same
network o f 1,000 nodes. Figure 3.2 - Figure 3.5 plot the simulation results. Each curve of
the plots is the average of 100 simulation runs.
Figure 3.2 plots the simulated number of infected machines with different
parameters. In Figure 3.2, s, is the simulation result of no immunization from healthy
machines, while s2 and sz show the simulation result when healthy machines are
immunized before getting infected. The difference of s2 ands3 is that s2 is the
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simulation result when the infection rate is less than the recover rate; s3 is the simulation
result when the infection rate is equal to the recover rate. The effect of immunization
from healthy machines is not negligible since both s 2and s3 increase slower than 5,. We
can sees, grows very slow since the infection rate is less than the recover rate.
Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5 give the simulation results and the expected
values from INIM model. Figure 3.3 shows when X > y , i.e., infection rate is greater than
the recover rate, the number of infected machine (s, is the simulation result, s2is the
expected value from INIM model ) is increasing as time goes on. Since healthy machines
are immunized at the same time, the number of infected machines (s, and s 2) do not
grow tremendously even though the infection rate is greater than the recover rate. With
the same immunization rate, when infection rate is equal to the recover rate (see Figure
3.4), the expected number of infection shown by the model ( s 2) is always a constant as
its initial value, which is 1. The simulation result (.s,) shows that the number of infected
machines is increasing very slowly instead of at a constant. The simulation result is
reasonable since our model shows the variance of the expected number of infection is
increasing as a function of time t (see Equation 3.2.11). If the infection rate is less than
the recover rate, the expected number of infection is zero (see s2 in Figure 3.6). The
simulation result is not zero but very close to it (see s, in Figure 3.5).
In all three figures (Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5), the simulation result
( s 3) and theoretical result ( s 4) o f the number of immunized machine grows much faster
than the number of infected machines. Also, we can see the theoretical results ( s 4) fit the
simulation results (53) better when infection just gets started. As time goes on, the
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difference between 53and s4 in all three figures (Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5)
becomes bigger. This is because when we build the model, for simplicity we assume
(i+m)/N -» 0 , but as time goes on, the number of immunized node is increasing, which
makes (i+m)/N bigger and not ignorable. Therefore, we cannot directly apply this model
to the whole life cycle o f propagation of a malicious mobile code. In the future, we may
use the exact value to build the stochastic model, but the solution of such a model will be
much more difficult to obtain.
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3.4 Summary
This chapter introduces the stochastic propagation modeling of a malicious
mobile code. Instead o f modeling the propagation in a homogeneous network, we
introduce a new factor B which represents the average number of neighbors a machine
could have. We proposed an INIM model propagation model which considers the
immunization from healthy and infected machines. We then use the probability
generation function method to obtain the expectation and variance of the number of
infected machines at time t. The simulation result showed that it is effective to use our
model to predict the propagation of malicious mobile programs, especially at the early
stage. Later on, we may use the exact value instead of the approximation that (i+m)/N
—» 0 , so that the time parameter will have less effect on the prediction accuracy. Using
the exact value of (i+m)/N makes the equation much more complex and the solution
becomes very difficult to obtain. We may explore other methods to solve the model in the
future.
In the INIM model we proposed in this chapter, the infection rate, immunization
rate, and recover rate are constant. This model could be refined by extending these
parameters to be time dependent.
This chapter discusses only the propagation of malicious self-replicating
programs. Similar models could be built to model the propagation of useful information
through the network. For example, we could model the propagation o f benign mobile
code, also called “good virus”. Analyzing the parameters that affect the propagation of
benign mobile code could help us design future network that favors the propagation of
such benign programs but throttle the propagation of those malicious programs.
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CHAPTER 4

EARLY DETECTION AND PROPAGATION MITIGATION
OF MALICIOUS MOBILE CODE
This chapter proposes a control system to automatically detect and mitigate the
propagation o f malicious mobile programs such as computer worms at the early infection
stage. The detection method is based on the observation that a worm always opens as
many connections as possible in order to propagate as fast as possible. Therefore, we can
monitor the connection rate to identify whether the status of a machine is normal or not.
To develop the control system, we propose a detection algorithm, in which we provide an
extension to the traditional statistical Process Control technique by introducing a sliding
window. We apply sequential probability ration test to control the risk of the detection
system so that the false positive rate is under certain threshold. We perform experiments
to demonstrate the training phase and the testing phase of the control system using both
real data and simulation data sets. Figure 4.1 shows the overall structure of the control
system.
The experiment shows that by adjusting the tuning parameters appropriately, the
control system can detect the propagation of malicious code with a zero false positive rate
and less than 6% false negative rate, which asserts that our control system is effective.

54
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We also analyze the propagation behavior of a network when the control system is
applied to different proportions of the machines.

Trailing
Infected Host

Testing

Re-Ti

Detedmg
System
Monitoring
Malicious Code
Arrived on Target

Target
Compromised

Y es

Abnormal
Behavior

(Mafcciau9 Code Propagation)

Control System
The steps o f m alicious code propagation: (1) Initial infection; (2) Acquire target; (3) Transfer m alicious
code; (4) Execute m alicious code. When abnormal behavior detected, the control system w ill quarantine the
infected host, therefore, no more machines w ill be infected.

Figure 4.1: The structure of the control system.

4.1 The Development of the Control System
Our control system includes a monitor and a controller. The monitor keeps track
o f the connection rate and reports it to the controller in real time. The controller makes
the decision about whether or not there is an anomalous behavior, based on its knowledge
from past experiences. This method belongs to behavior blocking, which is one of the
anomaly detection methods. We extend the traditional Process Control technique to
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devise the detection algorithm for the controller. The general steps of building a control
system are:
Step 1. Data collection:

Collect a normal data set for training
Collect a normal data set for testing
Collect an abnormal data set for testing

Step 2. Assumption checking: Check the normality assumption of the training data
Step 3. Training: Train the controller with the training data
Step 4. Testing: Test the control system using both the normal and the abnormal data.
Once these four steps are completed and the testing results are satisfying, the
control system could be put into monitoring. The following subsections give the details of
each step.
4.1.1 Data Collection
Since we are using the network connection behavior as an indicator of normal or
anomalous behavior, we need to collect both normal and abnormal connection data, both
from the same host. Under practical conditions, it is almost impossible to get connection
data, both normal and abnormal, under the same circumstances, because we have no idea
when there will be an outbreak of the malicious code. Fortunately, Goldsmith [Dave
2001] provided a connection request through TCP port 80 on July 18, 2001, the day when
the network is normal (see Table 4.1), and on July 19, 2001, the day when Code Red
broke out (see Table 4.2). The data was collected hourly.
The total connection rate Tc is defined as the total number o f TCP connections
that are built up in a given interval of time while the unique connection rate Uc is defined
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as the number of TCP connections built up to distinct destinations in a given interval of
time. Thus, we have
Q
T = —, where c is the number of connections in time t,
t
u
U = — where u is the unique number of connections in time t.
t
For example, if a machine builds up j connections to the same destination in a given time
interval t, the total connection rate is j/t, while the unique connection rate is 1/i.
Table 4.1 gives the data from which we can calculate the average Uc, and it is
about 17 connections per hour (cph) on July 18, 2001, while Table 2 gives the data from
which we can calculate the average Uc, and it is about 37,549 cph on July 19, 2001. We
plot the unique connection rate of both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 in Figure 4.3. Here, we
choose the unique connection rate instead of the total connection rate because a worm
program always tries to connect to as many new hosts as possible. Connecting to a new
host means opening a new connection from a local host to a remote machine. If we use
total connection rate, sometimes the rate is high simply because we need to build more
connections to the same remote machine, but not because of the propagation of malicious
code. For example, when we browse a web page, we build up connections to the remote
server through TCP port 80 o f the local machine. If the web page contains more than one
object, each object needs a TCP connection in order to make sure that the whole web
page is viewed properly. Web pages are formatted in a markup language called HTML
(HyperText Markup Language). Each picture file or audio file or video file is embedded
as an object in the HTML file of that web page. It is common for a web page to contain
more than one object and very few web pages contain only text. So when we open a web
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page with many objects, the total connection rate becomes high. However, since all these
connections are to the same remote machine, the unique connection rate will not change
unless we open new web pages that connect to another remote server.
Figure 4.2 plots the raw data from Table 4.1. We can see that the variation of Tc
is much larger than Uc. Generally, we prefer sample data with smaller variations because
small variation means that the data is more stable and hence the control system will give
fewer false alarms.
From Figure 4.3, we can see that Uc was small on July 18, 2001, when the
network was normal, then it grew tremendously when the malicious code started
propagating at about 10:00 a.m. on July 19, 2001. Figure 4.3 reinforces the idea that we
can detect the propagation of malicious code by monitoring the connection behavior,
specifically, the unique connection behavior of a machine. We analyze the characteristics
of the real data so that later on we can generate simulation data following the same
distribution as that of the real data for training and testing purposes. Let Y be a discrete
random variable that represents the number of the unique connections per hour, and
y x, y 2, •••y„ be n observations. The mean value of the normal sample y is

4.1
n
The standard deviation of the sample s is calculated as
n

X O . - t )2
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We have 24 observations, so n = 24. Plugging the values of the unique connection rate
from Table 4.1 into Equation 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, we get y = 17.62 and s = 3.23.

Table 4.1: Connection attempts from a host on July 18,2001
Hour

Total

Unique

Connections

Connections

0

143

20

1

148

15

2

89

15

3

96

18

4

144

22

5

127

16

6

98

15

7

111

16

8

116

15

9

149

22

10

143

18

11

175

24

12

134

22

13

146

20

14

118

21

15

95

17

16

133

22

17

104

17

18

78

17

19

76

15

20

67

15

21

85

15

22

62

12

23

105

14
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Table 4.2: Connection attempts from a host on July 19,2001
Hour

Total

Unique

Connections

Connections

0

120

17

1

81

12

2

62

11

3

97

20

4

85

18

5

128

20

6

140

20

7

212

34

8

645

137

9

5717

1281

10

36879

8186

11

150913

34361

12

362011

79789

13

519846

111148

14

556220

117946

15

547087

115193

16

540009

115983

17

519810

111290

18

499565

107106

19

390019

89331

20

14541

3493

21

9733

2233

22

9093

1882

23

8539

1672
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4.1.2 Assumption Checking
There are two reasons to check the normality assumption of the normal data:
(1) To know the distribution of the real data so that we can generate a simulation data
with the same distribution as that of the real data, to train the control system, and
(2) To be able to apply the Process Control (or Quality Control) technique because the
base data needs to satisfy the normality assumption.
-

Y " y-

We present the observed connection rate asy; = y + en where y = -

n

•' is the

average of the sample data and s t is the error term. Thus, checking the normality
assumption o f y {becomes checking the normality assumption of the residual s (. We use
normal probability plot, which is a plot of standardized residual against their normal
scores, to check the normality assumption of real data. Normal scores are the percentiles
of the standard normal distribution. Statisticians [Dean 1999] found that if the normality
assumption holds, a plot of the q th smallest standardized residual against the
100[(<y - 0.375)/(« + 0.25)] th percentile of the standard normal distribution for each
<7 =

1,2, •••n would show points roughly on a straight line through the origin with a slope

equal to 1.0. These percentiles are also called Blom’s normal scores. Blom’s q th
percentile is the value e for which
P(Z < s q) = (q - 0.375) /(« + 0.25)
where Z is a standard normal random variable. From the past experiences, statisticians
conclude that normality plot is useful when sample size n is at least 15 [Dean 1999].
The normality plot generated by a SAS program is shown in Figure 4.4. In Figure 4.4, the
Y-axis is the residual, and X-axis is Blom’s normal score s q. The points shown in Figure
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4.4 are roughly on a straight line through the origin, with slope equals to one. Although
the line is not absolutely linear, it does not exhibit extremely heavy tails. Consequently,
the normality assumption can be presumed to be approximately satisfied.
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A means that there is one observation corresponding to that particular point;
B means that there are two observations corresponding to that particular point,
and so on.
Figure 4.4: Normality plot of normal connection data on July 18,2001.

4.1.3 Simulation Data Generation
The reason we use simulation data instead of collecting real data is that we can
only collect normal connection behavior data, and it is almost impossible to get
anomalous connection behavior data under the same circumstances, since the outbreak of
malicious code does not happen very often and we have no idea when it will happen. The
control system we propose is host-based, which means each user needs to install it on the
local host to make it work. We cannot use the normal data of one host to train the control
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system and then put it to monitor the behavior of another host because the characteristics
of the connection behavior are different for one host to another. The best we can do is to
use the data provided by [Dave 2001], since this data is collected from the same host
under the same circumstances.
To generate the simulation data with the normal distribution as that of the real
data, we write a C++ program using the algorithm from Numerical Recipe [Vetterling
2002] which generates random numbers that follow a normal distribution. The function
Normal ( ) can generate random numbers with distribution N ( 0 , 1). We know that if a
X —ii
random variable X has a distribution ofN(/u, a 2) , then Y = ------— has a distribution
a
o f N ( 0 , 1). So the random variable X can be written asX = crY + /u. Therefore, we can
generate sequences o f random numbers with any normal distribution N ( j u , a 2) using
function the Normal ( ) that generates random numbers with a distribution ofN{Q,1).
Using this method, we generated a training data set and a testing data set.
4.1.3.1 Training data generation
We generate 30 training samples to represent the normal connection behavior of
one month, each day with 24 elements, with each element representing the unique
Internet connection rate (Uc) per hour. The elements of the training data set have a
normal distribution o f 7v(l7, 32), which is the same as the distribution that is obtained
from the real data we presented in Table 4.1.
4.1.3.2 Testing data generation
Every time we run the data generation program, the program generates a testing
data set with 1,000 samples that includes 600 normal samples and 400 abnormal samples.
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Each sample has 24 randomly generated elements to represent the number of unique
connections during each hour. For a better description, we number the samples from 0 to
999.
Sample 0-sample 599 simulate the normal connection behavior of a host.
The elements of sample 0-sample 199 follow the distribution of iv(l7,

32).

To simulate a normal gradual increase of process mean,
the elements o f sample 200-sample 249 follow iv(l 8.5, 32),
the elements of sample 250-sample 399 follow iv(20, 32),
the elements of samples 400-sample 449 follow tV(21.5,
the elements of samples 450-sample 599 follow

n

32), and

(23, 32).

Sample 600-sample 999 simulate the abnormal connection behavior of a host. To
simulate the change of the connection rate, in each of the abnormal samples, the first 8
elements still follow the distribution of normal connection behavior at

tv(23,

32), and

the rest o f the elements have abnormal connection rates. To make the sample closer to
real data, the value o f the sample elements increase a little bit after the eighth element,
and the value of the later elements keep increasing afterwards (as Figure 4.3 shows). To
simulate the stealthy worm whose connection rate generally does not increase to an
obvious high level, we generate random numbers from 29 to 39 as the abnormal elements
of sample 600-sample 799. To simulate the connection behavior of most current worms,
i.e., their attempt to connect to as many machines as possible, we generate random
numbers from 40 to 100 as the abnormal elements of sample 800-sample 999. So in the
simulation data, even the highest connection rate (which is 100) is much lessthan the
connection rate o f the real data (which is 1281, at 9 am, when the malicious codebroke
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out) as seen in Table 4.2. But the connection rate is still high enough to demonstrate the
efficiency o f our control system. For each abnormal sample, when we generate the
random numbers as abnormal elements, we sort them from small to large, so that each
sample is similar to the real data shown in Table 4.2.
This kind o f simulation is rough, but this is the best we can do based on the observation
of connection behavior and the real data that we have. Figure 4.5 shows the overall
distribution o f the testing data sets by calculating the average of every 50 samples
sequentially.

iO u u m l Data

150

250

350

450

950

S am ples

Figure 4.5: Distribution of testing data.

4.1.4 Detection Algorithm and Its
Statistical Analysis
Traditional Process Control technique includes two stages. Stage one is called the
Base Period during which the base data is collected and the normality assumption of the
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base data is checked as explained in Section 4.1.2. If the assumption is satisfied, we
estimate the mean and variance and then calculate the control limit (CL) from the mean
( / / ) and variance ( cr ) as
CL = fi ± A a
where A is a parameter determined by the control criteria. A bigger A makes the control
limit wider. Consequently, the probability of making a type I error is smaller, but the
r

probability of making a Type II error is greater.
Stage two is called the Monitoring Stage during which each new sample is
collected and identified to see whether it is within the control limit or not. If the sample is
beyond the control limit, a violation is detected. Figure 4.6 shows the procedure of the
detection o f the malicious mobile code using the traditional Process Control.

Upper Control Limit

17

Monitoring period

Base period

0

2

4

6

8

10 12

14 16 18

20 22

0

2

4

6

8

Time (United States Central time)

Figure 4.6: Traditional process control chart.
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The traditional Process Control procedure makes the operation simple, but it is
less adaptive to the changes developing in the process mean. Therefore, we extend the
traditional Process Control technique by adding a sliding window with size w so that the
base data always includes the most recent w observations. Whenever / new observations
are collected, we move the window forward to include these/ observations but still keep
the size o f the window the same. This way, the control system learns any change of the
connection behavior and adapts to it by itself, and the false alarm rate is therefore
reduced; / represents the updating frequency of the control limit. If / i s set to be 1, the
control limit is updated once a new observation is collected. High updating frequency
(i.e. low value o ff) adds unnecessary computation complexity to the system, while low
updating frequency (i.e. high value off) may lower the detection accuracy. Choosing an
optimal frequency (f) is discussed in the experiment section.
Figure 4.7 gives the framework of building a control system for a given host using
the extended Process Control technique. Figure 4.8 presents the monitoring procedure.

Algorithm: Early detection and propagation mitigation of malicious mobile code.
Procedure 1: Early Detection ( )
Initialize w and/; initialize i=0
1. Collect r samples as base data;
2. Check the normality assumption of base data.
3. If normality assumption is satisfied, continue to 4, otherwise stop.
4. Estimate mean and variance of base data;
5. Calculate the upper control limits;
6. Set sliding window with the most w samples of the base data.
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7. While system is online
Do
{
Call Monitoring Procedure;
If (z equals f)
{

Let i=0;
Move the sliding window forward so that the base data includes the most recent
/ observations;
Update mean, variance, and upper control limits;
} //end if
Otherwise i++;
}
End while

Figure 4.7: Early detection and propagation mitigation algorithm.

Procedure 2: Monitoring ( )
Begin
Collect new connection rate
Check the control limit
{
If new observation is within control limit, back to while loop of Procedure 1.
Otherwise, limit the outgoing connection and investigate the system
}
End.
Figure 4.8: Monitoring algorithm.

Figure 4.9 shows the control system using sliding window. We can see that the
window with size w keeps moving forward as the monitoring period goes on. Each time
when the sliding window has been moved forward, the mean and variance of the unique
connection rate are updated.
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Figure 4.9: Flow chart of the detection algorithm.

4.1.4.1 Confidence interval for mean u
Let X be the mean of a random sample of size n from a normal distribution with
mean ju and standard deviation s, the random variable

T = ^X JL

4 3

sH n
has t distribution with n

-1 degrees of freedom. The area between - t ajln_5 and ta/2

( I - a ) (area a 12 lies in each tail), so probability
< T <?a/2,»-l) = 1- «
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Consequently, the 100(1 - a ) % confidence interval for n is

(-^

U /2,n-l

I—
yin

’

U /2,n-l

i— ) •
yin

4.5

Moreover, when the area o f the upper tail is a , then probability
P { T < t a^ ) = \ - a .

4.6

So the upper confidence bound for /j. is

4.7
If we let a be 0.01, using Equation 4.5, the confidence interval for mean fj. of normal
unique connection rate is obtained as

Simplifying it, we get the 99% confidence interval for mean // as (15.77, 19.47), which
means the probability that the mean value of the normal unique connection rate lies in the
interval (15.77, 19.47) is 99%. Using Equation 4.7, the 99% upper confidence bound for
H is obtained as 19.27, which means the probability that the mean value of the normal

unique connection rate is less than 19.27 is 99%.
4.1.4.2 Upper control limit
In the industry, if the random sample of a monitored process falls in the area of
j u ± 3 a , we believe that the process is under control. In our case, we assume that the
mean ju and standard deviation cr are known, and their values are 17.62 and 3.23,
respectively. Hence, the control limit for the control system is 17.62 ± 3 x 3.23. Since we
know that when a malicious code propagates, it always increases the unique connection
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rate, then we only need to be concerned about the upper control limit. Therefore, when a
random sample falls beyond ju + 3a =27.31, an out of control signal will be given.
4.1.4.3 Level of significance
Let random variable Y denote the unique connection rate. It has normal
distribution with mean ft and variance a . Yl,Y 2,Y3,---,Yn are the random samples of the
unique connection rate. The monitoring period includes a hypothesis test at the given
significant level a , that is:
Null hypothesis
H 0 : Yt =fi
Against alternative hypothesis
Hr-

r,> fi

where ft is the estimated mean value using the connection data in the sliding window.
The Test statistic TS is obtained as
TS =

4.8

which has a Z distribution, so this hypothesis test is also called a Z test.
The rejection region for level a test is TS > z a , where za is defined as the point
such that P(Z > z a) = a ; z a is also called the critical value. An out-of-control signal
occurs whenever a point falls in the rejection region, and an investigation for possible
reasons should be initiated; a is the probability that we reject H 0 when H 0 is true,
which means we identify a connection behavior to be an anomalous behavior since it is
beyond the control limit when it actually is normal.
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Traditionally, the control limit is defined as /) ± 3cr . But since malicious programs
only increase but never decrease the connection rate, we are only concerned with the
upper limit, which is defined as ju + 3 a , and
P(Z > (// + 3<t)) =0.0013
Hence, the significance level a is 0.0013, which implies that the probability a
normal connection rate falls beyond the UCL is 0.13%.
4.1.4.4 P-value of the hypothesis test
The P -value is the smallest level of significance at which H 0would be rejected
when a specified test procedure is based on a given data set. If the significance level is
greater than P -value, the null hypothesis will be rejected; otherwise, the null hypothesis
will be accepted. The P -value of a hypothesis test lets us know whether the null
hypothesis is barely rejected or barely accepted by comparing the significance level
a and the P -value. Figure 4.10 illustrates the P-value in a Z test where the P-value is
greater than significance level a . So, TS does not lie in the rejection region and the null
hypothesis will not be rejected in the example given in Figure 4.10.

/

/

\

P-value

0

Figure 4.10: The P-Value of a Z test (TS: Test Statistic).
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The P-value o f a Z test can be obtained by checking a standard normal
probability table. For example, if the connection rate is 24, using Equation 4.8, the test
statistic is obtained as
r a = 2 4 - 17-6 5 = 1.966.
3.23
From the standard normal probability table, we approximately get
P (Z > 1.966) = 0.0247.
Hence, the P-value is 0.0247. Since the significance level we set is 0.0013, which is
much less than 0.0247, we can strongly conclude that the null hypothesis H 0 should not
be rejected.
4.1.4.5 Average run length
When a process is in control, we should observe many samples before we come
across one sample that is beyond the control limit (a false alarm). Define a random
variable S, such that S = the first i for which Y{falls outside the control limit.
If we think o f each sample as a trial and an out-of-control sample as a success, then S is
the number o f trials necessary to observe a success. The expectation of S (E(S)) is called
the Average Run Length (ARL), and ARL for a false alarm to appear could be obtained as
ARL = E ( S ) = - .
a

4.9

One reason why network users do not want to enable the intrusion detection systems is
that the intrusion detection systems may give off false alarms and these false alarms are
irritating to most people. Therefore, we need to make the false alarm rate as low as
possible, i.e., to make the ARL value as large as possible.
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For example, if the significance level of the hypothesis test is set at a =0.005, i.e., we
take Y + 2.575a as the upper control limit, then the false alarm rate is 0.5%. By
calculating, we get
ARL = E(S)= — = — -— =200,
a 0.005
which means when the process is under control, one false alarm could happen for every
200 observations.
The control system we designed takes Y + 3& as the upper control limit;
therefore, the hypothesis test is at significance level a =0.0013. Hence, we could get the
Average Run Length as
ARL = E(S) = —= — -— =769.23,
a 0.0013
which means when the process is under control, at the utmost, one false alarm could
happen for every 769 observations if we set the upper control limit of the connection rate
at 27.31.

4.2 Experiments
This section presents the details of building a control system using the simulation
data. The purpose of the experiments is:
•

To demonstrate the training process and the testing process of the control
system.

•

To test the reliability and the adaptability o f the control system.

•

To give a quantitative evaluation of how sliding window improves the
performance.
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•

To evaluate the effect of tuning parameters like, the sliding window size (w)
and the updating frequency (/).

4.2.1 Training
Before we train the control system, we should check whether or not the training
data follows normal distribution. Since we already checked the normality assumption of
the real data and the simulation data is generated following the same distribution as that
of the real data, we know that the training data also satisfies the normality assumption. So
we feed the training data to the controller and the controller learns the mean, variance,
and upper control limit from it.
4.2.2 Testing
We build two controllers: controller one uses the traditional Process Control
technique; controller two uses the extended Process Control technique with the sliding
window. We perform experiments using both controllers. This section shows the
reliability o f the control system and the performance of each controller. We also discuss
the choice of the optimal tuning parameters by testing their effects.
4.2.2.1 Performance analysis of the
control system
The performance of the control system can be analyzed by comparing the false
negative and the false positive rates of the two controllers (one using the traditional
Process Control and the other using the extended Process Control).
False Negative:
We first train the two controllers with the training data set. Then we run the controller
program 100 times to test the reliability, each time with a different testing data set. Both
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controllers detect all anomaly samples when malicious code starts spreading, so the false
negative rate o f both of them is zero.
False Positive:
Figure 4.11 plots the false positive rate of each experiment run. The false positive rate of
controller one is about 30% to 35% and the false positive rate of controller two is lower
than six percent. Therefore, we can demonstrate that the false positive rate is greatly
reduced when we apply the sliding window.
From Figure 4.11, we can also see that the performance of controller two is quite
reliable. It has an average false positive rate of 4.35% and no false positive rate higher
than 6% in any single run. Therefore, we conclude that the control system using the
extended Process Control technique is effective in detecting the propagation behavior of
malicious codes.

The sliding window plays an important role in reducing the false

positive rate when the process behavior changes. The effectiveness of the extended
Process Control can be attributed to this introduction of a sliding window, which causes
the control system to be more adaptable to the changes of the connection behavior.

□False positive of ti:racStionai Process Cotirol
□Falsepositive of
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a id
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Experiment run

Figure 4.11: Reliability of the control system applying traditional
and extended Process Control technique (w = 6 0 0 ,/ = 20).
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4.2.2.2 The effect of sliding window w
If the size of the sliding window w is too small, it will result in an inadequacy of
the model to properly represent the system dynamics, and will therefore lead to a poor
general performance. Conversely, if the window is too larger then the computational
complexity is unnecessarily increased. To choose an optimal value for w, we perform an
experiment with different sizes of the sliding window. For each size of the sliding
window, we run the experiment ten times and get the average false negative rate and the
false positive rate from these ten runs. Figure 4.12 and Figured 4.13 plot the average false
negative rate and false positive rate respectively when the window size varies from 20 to
720.
Figure 4.12 shows that when w increases, the false negative rate decreases.
The control system gets zero false negative rate when w is greater than 480. Figured 4.13
shows that when w is too small, the false positive rate is high, but it converges quickly to
about 6% when w increases above 40. The overall performance analysis of the control
system we presented in Figure 4.11 is given at w = 600.

0,9
0.8

0.5 ■0.4 • 0.3 • 0.2

--

Size o f th e slid in g w indow

Figure 4.12: False negative rate of the control system when the size of
sliding window w varies (The value of f is fixed at 1/ 20).
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Figure 4.13: False positive rate of the control system when the size of
Sliding window w varies (The value of f is fixed at 1/ 20).

4.2.2.3 The effect of updating frequency f
Let the number of new observations in the sliding window to be os , then the
updating frequency / is defined as / = — . When / is larger, the control system moves

the sliding window more frequently. Since the control rules are updated each time the
sliding window is moved forward, the computation complexity is increased. If / is too
small, the control system cannot catch the dynamic change of the connection behavior in
real time. Hence, the performance of the control system is degraded.
Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 plot the average false positive rate and false negative
rate respectively when / varies. Figure 4.14 shows that the false negative rate becomes
zero when 1/ f > 16. Figure 4.15 shows that the false positive rate is stabilized when
/ < 26 but increased dramatically when l / / > 26. Overall, the optimal/ value is between

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

80

1/16 and 1/26. The overall performance analysis of the control system we presented in
Figure 4.11 is given at 1/f - 20.
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Figure 4.14: False negative rate when/ varies
(The value of w is fixed at 600).
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Figure 4.15: False positive rate when/ varies
(The value of w is fixed at 600).
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4.3 Risk Analysis of the Control System
All intrusion detection systems have a false positive rate.

Therefore, there is

always a probability that a detection system detects a propagation that does not exist at
all. In statistics, this is also called producer’s risk. For an intrusion detection system, it is
extremely important to reduce the producer’s risk because it may lead to a complete
rejection o f usage. This section analyzes producer’s risk and introduced a novel idea of
using Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to control the risk.
4.3.1 Risk Analysis Using SPRT
Let the inspection result of the ith unit be denoted as X t, then X t=\ if there is
malicious code propagation detected; X t = 0 otherwise.
Let / represents the probability function of A , then
f ( \ , p ) = p and f (0,p) = I - p .
Here, p is interpreted as the false positive rate, that is, the probability of detecting a
malicious behavior of a healthy machine.
To test the hypothesis of H 0 : p = p 0 against H x \ p = p x, let p 0m and p lmbe the
probability of getting d m false detection in the sample ( X l, X 2, - - , X m) o f size m under
H 0and H ] , respectively. Then the Likelihood Ration

n
Pom

m
U f ( X i, P o )

P0 t1

4 . 10

rt \ m~“m
Po)

1=1

(1

A

4 .ll

log An = d mlog— + ( m - J m)lOg
Po

i-P o
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The SPRT for a hypothesis H 0 : p = p 0 against its alternative H x : p = p x is
carried as follows:
If log Am > A , reject H 0 and terminate the process.
If logAm < B , accept H 0 and terminate the process.
If B < logAm< A , collect observation X m+x, calculate \ogAm+x and compare the
value of log/Lm+1with A and B again.
Where A and B are constants defined as
.

,

A = log

1- p

_

P

.

— and B = log———
a
I-a

4.12

If we write
4.13
Po

.

Vl ~ P o )

then Equation 4.11 becomes
4.14

l°gAm = d mg x - ( t n - d m)g
So, we reject H 0 if

4.15
gx+g2

gl+g2

We accept H 0if
d mg x - { m - d m) g 2 < B

= >

dm

<

—

gx

-

—

g2

+m

—

g -2 - -

4.16

gx+g2

Then, the rejection line Lx is
d m = h i + sm

4.17

dm
m =h7l + sm

4. 18

and the acceptance line L2 is

where hx = ---------- , h2= -----------, and s = ------ —
gx+g 2

gx+g2

gx+g2
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From Equation 4.17 and Equation 4. 18, we can see hx and h2 are the interception of line
Z, and line L2 on the d m axis respectively, while s is the slope of both lines. Below is
the Risk Control Algorithm using line Lx, L2 and point (m,dm). And Figure 4.16 is the
control chart based on the risk control algorithm.
Risk Control Algorithm
1) Determine p 0, p x, a , /?;
2) Calculate A and B using Equation 4.12; Calculate g xand g 2 using Equation 4.13;
3) Get the value o f hx, h2 and s using Equation 4.19;
4) Draw rejection line Lxand acceptance line Z2 using 5 as slope and hx, h2 as
interception for Lx and Z2respectively as Figure 4.16 shows;
5) Get the m thsample, count dm;
6) Plot point (m, dm);
7) If point (m,dm) lies between Lx andZ2, back to 5; otherwise, stop.

(RejectionRegion)
A
Continne
m

LjZ d m= h}

(AcceptanceKcgion)

Figure 4.16: Risk control chart. If point (m, d m) lies below Z2, accept H 0;
if it lies above Z,, reject H 0; otherwise, keep sampling.
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4.3.2 Examples of Risk Control Using SPRT
Let the false positive rate be p 0, since we are using a one-sided control process
with 3cr as the control limit, />o=0.001. To test the hypothesis that the false positive rate
is p Q, we have
H 0 : p = p 0 against H x: p = p x
Letp x = 0.002, a - 0.01, /? = 0.05, we get
A = log1~ ° 'Q5 = 1.978
0.01
B =log— = -1.297
0.99
, 0.002 „ . . .
g x = log--------= 0.301
1
0.001
.
1-0.002
.
g 7 = - log------------- = 4.349x10
2
1-0.0013
hx = — - — =6.563
gl+g2

h2 = — - — =- 4.303
gx+gl
s=

82
= 0.0014.
gl+g 2
Therefore, the rejection line Lx is: d r = 6.563 + 0.0014/w; the acceptance line L2 is

d a = -4.303 + 0.0014w.
Table 4.3 lists two examples of using SPRT to control the risk of false positive.
We plot the acceptance example on Figure 4.17. From Figure 4.17, we can see that points
lies in the middle until m = 3800.1ies acceptance region when, which means we should
accept hypothesis

H

0. In other words, the false positive rate is the same as we expected

from the theory. We also take one sample from the stealthy malicious code whose
propagation is hard to observe because of the low connection rate. Using the detection
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result of the stealthy malicious code, the sequential ratio test is processed as Table 4.3
Example 2 shows. Plot Example 2 on Figure 4.18, we can see when m = 760, the point
lies in the rejection region, which means

H

0 is rejected and we should accept the

alternative. Therefore, we should adjust the control limit so that the false positive rate
could be reduced to what we expected.

Table 4.3: Risk analysis using SPRT
Example 1: An Acceptance Example

Example 2: A Rejection Example
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Figure 4.17: An acceptance example of risk control (Since point (1,3800)
falls in the acceptance region, we should accept the hull hypothesis).
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Figure 4.18: A rejection example of risk control (Since point (8, 760)
falls in the rejection region, we should reject the hull hypothesis).

4.4 Network Performance Analysis
This section analyzes the propagation behavior of malicious code when the control
system applied. We compare the performance of a network when different number of
machines applied the control system. The performance is evaluated by the mathematical
propagation models. We extend the propagation models introduced in Chapter 2 by
introducing a new factor, which we will give the detail in the following section. We also
design a serial o f propagation simulations in a network with control system. The
simulation result is consistent with the theoretical result, which implies the success of the
control system. The notation we use in this section follows the same definition given in
Chapter 2.
4.4.1 Extended SI Model
In Chapter 2, we have presented the standard SI model that assumes the
population is homogeneously mixed, which is not true in the real world. In Chapter 3, we
have introduced a new factor B, the average number of contactors an individual has in a
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given time period, into the stochastic propagation model. Here, we will present the
deterministic SI model with factor B.
Assuming we have only one machine infected at time zero, the total number of
infected individuals can be modeled as:
dlif) = B N - lit)
dt
N

^

with

=1
w

Let i = I / N and k = J3- B, dividing both sides of Equation 4 . 2 0 by N, we get
di(t)/dt = £ ( 1 - i(t))i(t)

4 .2 1

The solution of the general epidemic model given as Equation 4 . 2 1 is

1(0 =

ekt
77
N - l + ekl

f

4 .2 2

where k is the infection rate. Infection rate is the number of machines that could be
infected by one infectious machine in one time unit.
4.4.1.1 Fitting the observed data with
extended SI model
The computer worm Code Red exploits the buffer-overflow vulnerability in
Microsoft’s IIS web server [Moore
about

1 0 :0 0

2 0 0 2 ].
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19.

The propagation of Code Red is noticed at

The propagation stops at

designing o f Code Red. It infected more than
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hours of propagation [Moore

2 0 0 1 ].

2002]

[Caida
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midnight by the

machines during approximately

Code Red randomly generates

13
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threads; each thread randomly chooses one IP address and connects to the machines with
corresponding IP addresses through port

80

[Zou
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remote, administrator-level access to the infectedmachine so thatthe machinecould be
used to executeany code [Moore

2 0 0 2 ].

Therefore, it is highlydangerous.Figure
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shows the observed Code Red propagation. The infection came to saturating around
20:00, and the propagation stops at 12:00 midnight, so the number of infected host in
Figure 4.19 does not change after 12:00 midnight.
Assume that the total number of vulnerable hosts is 400,000. If we fit the model
with k = 0.8, we get the theoretical result o f Code Red propagation in Figure 4.20..
Compare Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20, we conclude that even the simple SI epidemic
model provides a reasonably good approximation of malicious mobile code propagation.
The observed value does not grow as smooth as the theoretical model because the
network bandwidth is exhausted by the malicious code so that it cannot connect and
infect the target machine as it does at the early infection stage.

Code Red Norm - infected hosts
400000

350000

300000

250000

3 £00000

-

150000

100000

50000

00:00

0 7 /19

04:00

0 8:0 0

1 2:00

1 6 :00
time <UTC>

00:0 8
07/2 0

0 4 :0 0

Figure 4.19: Observed Code Red propagation (From www.Caida.orgl.
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Figure 4.20: Theoretical result of Code Red propagation.

4.4.2 Propagation Modeling with
Control System
As we discussed in Chapter 2, when propagation starts, the speed is slow at the
very beginning, then it comes to the fast spreading stage during which the number of
infected nodes grows tremendously, and finally the infection speed slows down since
very few susceptible nodes are still available. At the first and the second stages, the
number o f infected nodes grows almost exponentially. If all hosts use the control system,
the infection speed could be greatly reduced and the infection may never get to the third
stage because countermeasures taken by humans could immunize nodes when they are
healthy. In the following subsection, we present the propagation model with the control
system and give a quantitative evaluation of the effects of the control system. We do not
consider immunization and recover in this model.
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When a malicious code detection system is applied in a network, a healthy host
might be flagged as infected (False Positive), and an infected host might not be detected
and therefore declared as healthy (False Negative) (See Figure 4.21). A false positive will
not affect the propagation o f a malicious code, so we do not need to consider it in the
propagation model. Suppose p percent of the hosts installed the control system and the
detection rate o f the control system is d. We know that the false negative rate is 1 - d .

S: Susceptible
FP: False positive

I: infected
FN: false negative

Figure 4.21: State transition of extended SI model with detection system.

When a machine is detected with malicious code, its connection rate is limited.
Ignoring the one unit detection delay, we have
4.23
where /, = I ■p - d , I 2 = I •(l - p ) + 1 •p - ( l - d ) ; B l is the limited number of contactors a
machine could have when infection is detected; B2is the number o f contactors a machine
could have when infection is not detected, and B2 » Bx.
Let kx = / ?•#, , k2 - / 3 - B 2, i = I I N , / , = / , / N , i2 = I 2 1 N , then from Equation 4.23,
we obtain
di I dt = k, (1 —i)/j + k 2(1—i)i2
The solution of Equation 4.24 is
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Figure 4.22 shows the infection delay when a different percentage of hosts install
the control system. Obviously, the more hosts installing the control system, the better the
results are. If only 20% o f the hosts adopt the control system, the overall effect is very
limited. When p is about 80% or 90%, the difference is huge.

0 5

©I
W-

p=0 8

T i m e Unit

Figure 4.22: Infection evolution with different p values
( N = 10,000, j3 = 0.8, d = 1.0).

4.4.3 Simulation
This section conducts simulation experiments to verify the prediction of the
spreading speed and scale given by the models. We first simulate a simple epidemic
propagation model, and then we simulate the propagation model with the control system.
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4.4.3.1 Simulation setup
Our simulation program includes a network generator and an infection process.
Every time we run the simulation, the network generator will generate a random network
with 5,000 nodes. Each node has a switch. If the switch is on, the control system is turned
on; otherwise, the control system is off. The number of neighbors has a uniform
distribution of (1, 20). The neighbors of each node are randomly generated. Neighbors of
a given node are defined as the nodes that the given node will contact in an infection
process. Figure 4.23 gives the general structure of each node in C++ style. Once node j is
randomly chosen as the neighbor o f node i, we also add node i as node f s neighbor.

General Structure of Each Node in the Random Network
struct node {
// declare the Unique ID of the node
int id;
//the number o f neighbors allows; this number has uniform distribution
int egNo;
//node status; 1 = healthy; 0 = infected; -1 = immunized
int status;
// switch of the control system,
bool control; // control=l, control system on; control = 0, no control system
//to specify the node is infected or not in current dt or before
bool newlnf;
// store the id o f its neighbors
int array nborID[ ];
// the total number o f neighbors
int nborNo;
} End node
Figure 4.23: General structure of each node.
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One node is randomly selected as the initially infected node. We use time step to
represent the time unit dt in the propagation models. During each time step, each infected
node tries to infect its neighbors with pair wise infection rate (3.
4.4.3.2 Propagation simulation of SI model
To simulate the simple epidemic model without the control system, we just turn
off the switch. We run the simulation 100 times. Figure 4.24 plots the infection process
by taking the average o f all simulation runs. The simulation is a little slower than the
theoretical model at the early infection stage. Overall, the simulation results are close to
the theoretical results, so we conclude that simple epidemic model given by Equation
4.20 matches the general propagation phenomena. Since the real data have validated the
accuracy of the theoretical model as shown in Section 4.4.1, and the simulation result is
close to the theoretical model, we conclude that the simulation does approximate the real
infection phenomenon. Therefore, we are confident that our further simulations
approximate the real propagation scenarios.

9

simulation r e s i t
• model result

V

\<-

Time s t e p

Figure 4.24: Simulation results and theoretical results of
SI model ( k = 0.4, p = 0).
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4.4.3.3 Propagation simulation
with control system
We simulate four cases of worm propagation with control system. In each case,
the percentage of nodes with control system on is different. Every time we run the
infection simulation, we randomly choose p percent of the nodes with control system
turned on. During propagation, an infected node tries to infect its neighbors with a lower
infection rate (k value) if the switch is on; otherwise, we keep using the same infection
rate (k value) as in Section 4.4.3.2. We run the simulation 100 times for each case. Table
4.4 shows the average time units needed to infect certain percentage of the network nodes
under different cases.

Table 4.4: Simulation results of four different p values
Case No.

P

T1

T2

1

20%

5.5

68.7

2

50%

9.9

124.9

3

80%

12.1

161.4

4

90%

25.2

192.4

p is the percentage of hosts with control system on.

T1 is the time steps needed to infect half of the nodes.
T2 is the time steps needed to infect all the nodes.

Figure 4.25 and Figure 4.26 show the infection evolution when p = 0.8 and
p = 0.9, respectively. We also plot the infection results of the theoretical model. We can
see the theoretical results match the simulation results. Furthermore, the average time
needed to infect the population decreases dramatically when increased from 0.8 to 0.9.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

95

From Table 4.4, we know it takes about 12 time steps to infect half o f the nodes when
p = 0.8, but 25 time steps when p = 0.9.
Table 4.4, Figure 4.25, and Figure 4.26 illustrate that when p is less than 20%, the
propagation limiting effect is very small, but when p is more than 50%, the slowing down
effect is obvious. In summary, both simulation and theoretical model show the
effectiveness of applying the control system. To fight the malicious mobile programs
efficiently and to minimize the overall damages, we should not just think about protecting
ourselves from the outside world, or just depend on a few hosts to do the good deeds. In
order to get the satisfactory result of propagation restriction, we need to have at least 50%
of the hosts o f an organization or community to install the control system. This is also the
limitation o f the control system.

simulation result

-theoretical result

0.8
0.6
S)

0.4
0.2

tim e s te p

Figure 4.25: Simulation result and theoretical result of malicious code
propagation when p = 0.8 ( N = 5000).
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—•— simulation result

a theoretical result

tim e s t e p

Figure 4.26: Simulation result and theoretical result of malicious
code propagation when p = 0.9 (N = 5000).

4.4.4 Conclusion
In this section, we modify the standard SI model by introducing a new factor B.
We present the propagation models with and without the control system. We fit the
observed Code Red propagation data into the theoretical model and the result is
satisfactory. The simulation of Code Red propagation is close to the observed data.
Therefore, we conclude that the propagation simulation approximates the real
propagation o f malicious mobile code, and the conclusions we draw from the simulation
experiments are reasonable.
The mathematical analysis of modified SI models (Equation 4.20) and the model
with control system (Equation 4.23) shows that the control system helps reducing the
spread o f malicious code. The propagation scale is reduced more when more other hosts
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are using the control system. Further simulation verifies the prediction of the number of
infected hosts using the theoretical models.

4.5 Discussion
The proposed control system is host-based and it is adaptive to the characteristics
of the local host. Once installed, it leams the local host’s connection behavior and blocks
the anomalous behavior based on the host’s own normal behavior. Besides, when the
host’s behavior changes, the detection system leams the changes and makes the
corresponding changes in its operating parameters, and thus ensures that the false alarm
rate is reduced.
4.5.1 Detection Delay
The detection delay o f the control system depends on the time interval between
two observations. In this experiment, since the unique connection rate data is recorded
per hour, the detection delay is one hour. However, when we put the system into real use,
the one-hour monitoring interval is too long when malicious code really exists. We
should set the monitor interval smaller: for instance, one minute, or even one second
depending on the security requirement. In the experiment, we use one-hour interval just
because the real data we have is collected per hour. Besides, the main purpose of the
experiment is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the control system.
4.5.2 The Advantages of the Control System
Normally, the side effect of high false positive rates in intrusion detection systems
is that when an anomaly is detected, the machine is isolated from the network by the
intrusion detection system. This may lead to the annoyance of a network user whose
work will be hampered and ultimately may cause the user to discard the intrusion
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detection system. In order to decrease this side effect, the control system does not isolate
the machine from the network when anomaly is detected but just limits the connection
rate to a lower level. The advantage of doing this is that a user will not get annoyed and
discard the control system because of the false alarms. The propagation o f malicious code
is automatically reduced, though not completely blocked, if hosts have the control system
installed. Therefore, the overall damage to the machine and the network and thereby our
society, caused by the malicious code is reduced, and the degree of reduction highly
depends on the percentage o f hosts that adopt the control system in the community. In the
next chapter, we will discuss the relationship between the propagation scale and the
percentage o f hosts that have the control system installed, using some mathematical
models.
4.5.3 The Limitation of the Control System
One limitation of the control system is that it cannot detect malicious code that
does not propagate through Internet connections. For example, some malicious code may
propagate through e-mail, usually as e-mail attachment. The machine gets infected when
people open the attachment. The malicious code will scan the address list of the victim
and sends e-mails with the same malicious attachment to everybody in the address list
automatically. In this case, we can define the normal behavior as the traffic size or the
number of e-mails sent/received by a machine in a certain period of time. The same
framework can be applied to build and train the control system. The only difference is
that the monitored behavior is not the number of connection requests but the number o f emails sent/received in a given period of time. Similarly, we can extend the control system
and apply it to monitor the behavior of the server system. The important thing is that we
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need to define the normal behavior that can differentiate the normal and abnormal status
o f a system.
Another limitation is that the network performance relies on the portion of
machines with control system. The performance improvement evaluated by infection
delay does not have a linear relationship with the portion of machines with control
system. In fact, the control system has little effect if only a few machines of the whole
network are using it.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presented the development of the control system using Process
Control technique. We checked the normality assumption of the real data and generated
the simulation data with the same characteristics o f that of the real data. Then, we showed
the training and the testing process of the control system. The test results showed that the
control system achieved zero false negative rate and less than 6% false positive rate when
we used the optimal tuning parameters. Therefore, the control system is reliable in
detecting the propagation o f malicious mobile code. We also discussed the detection
delay, the advantages and limitations of the control system. The uniqueness of this
approach includes:
•

It is novel to apply the Process Control theory in the early detection of
malicious mobile code propagation.

•

The addition o f a sliding window to the traditional Process Control algorithm
is very aboriginal, and this makes the system adaptive to the changes of the
connection behavior.
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•

The hypothesis test underlying the monitoring period gives a statistical
explanation and quantitative measurement of the detection accuracy.

•

The Sequential Probability Ratio Test ensures the quality o f the detection
system.

•

The mathematical models validate the efficiency of the control system in a
network environment.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

5.1 Conclusion
This dissertation discusses propagation modeling of malicious mobile code, and
proposes a control system to detect and mitigate the propagation of malicious code
automatically. The goals o f our work are: (1) Propagation evaluation and prediction of
malicious code using stochastic models; (2) Early detection and propagation mitigation of
malicious code. We have been successful in achieving the goals since the simulation
results match the theoretical results from the propagation models, and the control system
we proposed detects the propagation of malicious code with zero false negative rate and
less than 6% false positive rate.
Chapter 1 is an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 introduces the
backgrounds and related research.
Chapter 3 presents stochastic propagation modeling of malicious mobile code. We
build a propagation model, INIM model, considering passive immunization from both
healthy machines and infected machines. Probability generation function technique is
used to get the explicit solution of the stochastic propagation models. The propagation
results from the solution match the simulation results, which implies that it is reliable to
use the propagation model to evaluate and predict the propagation of a malicious mobile
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code. To detect and mitigate the propagation of malicious mobile code automatically, we
propose a control system using statistical process control techniques in Chapter 4. We
extend the traditional process control by adding a sliding window so that the changes of
process mean will not affect the detection result. We present the general steps of building
a control system and give a statistical analysis of the control system. We also present the
details o f data collection, assumption checking, training, and testing. The simulation data
we used in training and testing are generated based on the real data we have. In the
simulation experiments, we discuss the effects of tuning parameters like the size of the
sliding window and the updating frequency. The testing results are satisfying and the
false positive rate is reduced from more than 30% to less than 6% when the sliding
window is applied. We also used sequential probability ratio test to control the false
positive rate so that it will never exceed the threshold. Network performance analysis
shows that the relationship between propagation mitigation effect and the portion of
machines applied control system is not linear. Experiments show that if less than 30% of
the machines in a network applied the control system, the effect is negligible, but if more
than 90% o f the machines applied control system, the propagation delay is significant,
which gained us precious time to fight for it.

5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Network Immunization
Malicious computer mobile codes have been considered as a form of artificial life
[Spafford 1994] [Thimbleby 1998] since (1) it exists in space and time; (2) it has the
characteristic self-reproduction; (3) information is stored when malicious mobile code
replicates itself; (4) it interacts with the environment and damages are caused by these
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interactions; (5) it has interdependent parts as live organism has; and (6) it mutates.
People also argue that malicious mobile code has a kind of metabolism because it takes
electrical energy to disseminate its patterns of instructions and infect other systems
[Spafford 1994]. Biologically inspired immune systems are developed for computer
systems [Forrest 1997] [Harmer 2002] [D'haeseleer 1996] [Kephart 1994]. These immune
systems profile the normal activities of a machine as self and detect intrusions as non-self.
Immune systems proposed in [Forrest 1997] [Harmer 2002] [D'haeseleer 1996] [Kephart
1994] are basically intrusion detection systems using misuse detection method. The
immunization we discuss in this chapter is different from the immune systems. The
immunization o f malicious mobile code is more like the immunization of epidemic
diseases o f human beings.
Immunization has been very successful in controlling epidemic diseases of human
beings. Small pox, the disease that originated the research of epidemic modeling, has
been eradicated since vaccination is available to everyone. This chapter defines two
immunization strategy terms for immunization of malicious mobile code. One is called
passive immunization; the other is called active immunization. Propagation models of
malicious mobile code considering the effect of passive immunization and active
immunization are presented, respectively. In active immunization, we present the idea of
using beneficial mobile code to fight against malicious code.
5.2.1.1 Propagation modeling with
passive immunization
When an active malicious code is found propagating along the network system, a
security expert will analyze its signature. The way to remove the malicious and fix the
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system will be released to the public once it is available. Users whose machines have
been infected will take action to immunize the machine.
Definition: An immunization is called passive immunization if the immunization action
is taken by human beings.
We divide the lifetime of a malicious code T into two stages. Stage one (Tx) is the
period during which the immunization of certain malicious code is not available. Stage
two (T2) is the period during which the immunization method has been announced. The
propagation models we presented in Network Performance Analysis of Chapter 4
describe the propagation of malicious code in Tx. Here, we present the propagation model
in T2.
Suppose the immunization rate of infected machine is y . Following the same
notations given in previous chapters, in a homogeneous network, the deterministic
propagation model in T2 is
' dS(t)
= -0 S (t)I(t)
dt
d l(t)
dt
dM(t)
= y l( t)
dt
S(t) + I(t) + M (t) = N

_
t> t1

5.1

with initial conditions S(0) = N - I 0, 7(0) = / 0, and M (0) = 0 ; tl is the moment that
immunization method is available.
Usually, when a computer system is infected, the user of that system may tell this
to his/her friends. Also, people may get the message from the media or the Internet. The
warning message about the malicious code will be disseminated, and people may take
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action to prevent the machine from getting infected. Therefore, healthy machines could
also be immunized. The warning message traverses through the social network of human
beings. The network topology has little effect on passive immunization rate since the
spread o f warning message does not go through the computer network. Chapter 3 gives
the model which considers passive immunization from both healthy and infected
machines. The model we present below considers the control system we proposed in
Chapter 4.
Let a denote the immunization rate of a healthy machine and y denote the
immunization rate of the infected machine. Suppose p percent of the machines in our
network installed the control system, and the average number of neighbors a machine has
is B, then the propagation model of the malicious code is given as
dS^ = - aS(t) - / XJ3BX^
- I 2(3B
dt
w
w 1 N
2 2 N
dt

'

' N

L

* N

w

t> t,

^ j p - = ctS(t)+ jf(t)
S (t)+ l(t) + M (t)= N
with initial conditions ,5(0) = N - I 0, 1(0) = / 0, M (0) = 0. I x, / 2, Bx and B2follow the
same notations we gave in Chapter 4.
5.2.1.2 Propagation modeling with
active immunization
Mobile programs are also called self-replicating programs because it has a selfreproducing mechanism. Self-replicating mobile codes are considered to be malicious by
most people since the earliest and most prevalent self-replicating mobile program is
malicious. However a self-replicating mobile program does not have to be malicious; it
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can be designed to be beneficial [Chen 2004] [Eugster 2004] [Thimbleby 1999]
[Bontchev 1994]. For example, mobile 'code can be designed to travel from machine to
machine and do useful work in a distributed environment [Levis 2002] [Eugster 2004];
mobile code can be used to fight against the malicious programs [Bontchev 1994]. The
designed network should favor the dissemination of benign mobile code but throttle the
spread o f malicious mobile code. If a beneficial mobile code that is designed to fight
against the malicious one spreads faster than the malicious one, the overall network
system will become less vulnerable.
Definition: An immunization is called active immunization if the immunization action is
automatically taken by benign mobile code.
Suppose a benign mobile code immunizes the healthy machines with rate a and
the infected machines with rate y . In a homogeneous network, the propagation model of
the malicious code becomes

dt

= -j3S(t)I(t) - aS(t)M (t)

dt

t > tr

5.3

= aS(t)M (t)+ yI(t)M (t)
dt
S(t) + I(t) + M (t) = N
with S(0) = N - I 0, 7(0) = 70, M(0) = 0 , and M (t1) = M 0; M(t) still denotes the number
o f machines that has been immunized. The big difference between these immunized
machines and the ones in previous models are that these immunized machines
automatically disseminate a copy of the benign mobile code to its neighbors so that the
neighbors o f this machine could also be immunized.
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Suppose the average number of neighbors a machine has is B, and the benign
mobile code propagates through exactly the same network as the malicious one does. In
the network that p percent of the machines applied the control system, then the
propagation model o f malicious mobile code is
=

■ dt

= I l/3Bl ^

^

N

- I 2J3B2 ^

+ I 2j3B2^ - - y B m M i f )
N
2 2 N

t > t

5.4

= ccB ^M (t)+ y B ^ M ( t )
dt
N
N
S (t)+ l(t)+ M (t)= N

with 5(0) = N —I 0, 1(0) = I 0, M ( 0) = 0 , M (tl ) = M 0
The idea o f using benign mobile code to fight against the malicious code has been
implemented in current commercial anti-virus tools. When fixing method of a malicious
code is available, the anti-virus companies will automatically update its users’ virus
definition database. But the anti-virus companies will do this only if people pay them.
Furthermore, a user’s machine cannot disseminate the updating to other machines.
5.2.1.3 Simulation
The immunization simulation is an extension of the propagation simulation with
the control system. An immunization procedure is added to the simulation program we
used in Chapter 4. Each time we run the simulation, when t is less than /,, it follows
exactly the same infection evolution we have done in Chapter 4; when t is larger than tx,
which means immunization method becomes available, both infection and immunization
procedures are running and they are running independently. In the simulation, we assume
the immunization method is available when t - 15. A node cannot be infected if it has
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been immunized. The simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of the immunization
strategies. Each result is obtained by running the simulation 10 times based on the same
random network with 5,000 nodes.
Simulation o f Passive Immunization
In passive immunization, the immunization procedure randomly immunizes the
infected node with rate gamma, and the healthy node with rate alpha. It is more likely that
an infected machine becomes immunized because a user with an infected machine is
more likely to seek out available methods to fix the problem. In the simulation, we set
alpha = 0.01, and gamma = 0.1. Figure 5.1 shows the infection evolution of propagation
model given by Equation 5.2 in which the effect of passive immunization is modeled.

imm

- inf

sus

0.4
0.2

time step

Figure 5.1: Infection evolution with passive immunization
(TV= 5000, a = 0.01, y = 0.1, p = 0.8, tx= 15).

Simulation o f Active Immunization
In

active immunization, it is easier for a benign mobile code toimmunize a

healthy machine than an infected machine because for a healthy machine, thebenign
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program just needs to fix the flaw that has been exploited by the certain malicious code,
while for an infected machine, it has to remove the malicious program as an additional
work. Therefore, we set alpha = 0.1, and gamma = 0.05 in the simulation. Figure 6.2
shows the infection evolution of model given by Equation 5.4 in which the effect of
active immunization is modeled. Comparing Figure 5.2 to Figure 5.1, we can see active
immunization is slower than passive immunization at the beginning, but once there are
have enough “good” seeds in the network, the machines are immunized at a dramatic
speed. After 50 time units, almost all machines are immunized if active immunization
applied, and only one third are immunized if passive immunization applied. Overall,
active im m unization has better performance. However, the implementation of such
benign mobile code is not easy. If not properly designed, the benign mobile code may
bring another disaster.
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Figure 5.2: Infection evolution with active immunization
( N = 5000, a = 0.1, y = 0.05, p = 0.8, = 15).
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5.2.2 Passive Immunization and
Network Topology
The immunization strategies we used to prevent infectious diseases for human
beings include:
•

Random immunization.

•

Target immunization, for example, immunization by group.

We could have similar strategies when we apply passive immunization to malicious
mobile code. The immunization we discuss in Section 5.2.1 is purely random, and we
have no idea who will and who will not immunize the machine. In the future, we could
have the security experts apply passive immunization according to the priority of the
machines. For example, we immunize the Internet routers or network backbones first,
then we immunize the nodes with a higher number of neighbors. The information of
network topology helps us to decide the target nodes with more than an average number
of neighbors. We should analyze the effect of random immunization and target
immunization under network topologies so that we can apply the optimal immunization
strategy for a network with certain topology.
5.2.3 Active Immunization and
Network Topology
If we use a graph to represent a subnet in which malicious code traverse, we get a
graph whose nodes are machines infected by the malicious code, and the lines between
nodes are the ways malicious code propagate. The propagation model we give as
Equation 5.4 assumes that benign mobile code propagates through the same subnet a
malicious one does. In reality, these two may not propagate through the same subnet.
Also the spreading rate of benign mobile code must be higher than the malicious one to
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prevent the outbreak o f malicious code. Previous research has shown that the topology o f
underlying subnet affects the spread of mobile code dramatically [Chen04]. We will do
more research on how topology affects the propagation speed of mobile code. In the
future, we will build propagation models that could catch the effect of topology and
design networks that makes a benign mobile code spread faster.
5.2.4 Distributed Malicious Mobile
Code Detection
The control system we propose in this dissertation is host based. The effect of
propagation mitigation is not good if the number of machines in a network that applied
the control system is small. It takes much time and effort to make sure that every machine
in the network applied the control system properly. A better way to achieve the same
effect is to build a control center. Monitors are distributed in the network and each
monitor reports to the control center periodically. When a host is identified with
abnormal behavior, its outgoing Internet connections will be limited. At the same time,
the control center will send a message to other machines in the network. We do not want
to disable the function o f the whole network. One way to defend against the possible
malicious code is choosing some nodes in the network and limiting the outgoing
connection of these nodes so that the propagation of malicious code will be slowed down.
More research needs to be done on how to decide the number of nodes we should choose,
and the policy o f choosing specific nodes so that the propagation could be slowed down
maximally with minimum effect on the normal function of the network.
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